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INTRODUCTION

The first installment of this two-part Article series illustrated how the
federal and state lawmaking processes disadvantage urban areas.1 That
disadvantage accounts for the inability of a president strongly preferred by
urban voters, Barack Obama, to accomplish much, if any, of his domestic
agenda after 2010. It also explains, at least in part, the one-party
domination of the federal government as of 2017. Despite losing the
popular vote by almost three million, Donald Trump nonetheless won the
Electoral College by a margin of 304–227.2 Republicans won the total vote
for the United States House in 2016 by just a percentage point, yet maintain
an ironclad seat majority of 241–194.3 Finally, in the Senate, despite holding
a 52–48 advantage in seats, Republicans represent a minority of the nation’s
population.4 This new, one-party federal government can be expected to

1. See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1–The Urban
Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287 (2016)
[hereinafter Urban Disadvantage].
2. Hillary Clinton was thought to have won seven more electors’ votes,
making for a 304–234 loss, but these seven defected and cast their votes for other
candidates, mostly as a protest. See Scott Detrow, Donald Trump Secures
Electoral College Win, with Few Surprises, NPR (Dec. 19, 2016, 4:52 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2016/12/19/506188169/donald-trump-poised-to-secureelectoral-college-win-with-few-surprises [https://perma.cc/ZUG9-CBRY].
3. Ballotpedia has the Republicans winning 49.13% of the popular vote and
Democrats winning 48.03%. United States House of Representatives Elections,
2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representa
tives_elections,_2016 [https://perma.cc/JUG3-68U9] (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
4. See E.J. Dionne Jr., The Minority Is in Charge, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE (Dec. 8, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/2016
/12/08/The-minority-rules/stories/201612080063 [https://perma.cc/KS3L-EWFE]
(noting that after 2016 elections, Senate Democrats will represent 55.33% of the
nation’s population).
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pursue policies that skew toward the rural and exurban voters who formed
such an important part of its victory coalition.
At the state level, the urban disadvantage has played out vividly in
states like North Carolina, where the legislature in 2016 preempted
Charlotte’s municipal transgender protections through the “Bathroom
Bill.”5 Other states stand on the precipice of enacting similar preemptive
legislation.6 In other “purple” states like Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, the state legislatures have aggressively
preempted local authority in numerous important substantive areas, from
minimum wage and paid sick leave to gun control.7 As the first part of this
series argued, these policies likely do not represent the views of the median
voter in these states, but rather skew toward the preferences of rural and
exurban voters.
Hence, at least for those with progressive political leanings, local
government is often now seen as the most responsive and nimble level of
government in the United States and indeed worldwide. From public
health and gay rights to climate change and gun control, cities’ activism

5. H.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016) (preempting
Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (Feb. 22, 2016)), http://charmeck.org/city/char
lotte/nondiscrimination/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/P78V-KDV4]. The
scope of the state preemption law was sweeping. It prohibits not only additional
local employment and public accommodation protections of any kind beyond state
law, but also any local minimum wage ordinances. Id.
6. David A. Graham, What’s Behind the New Wave of Transgender
“Bathroom Bills”?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics
/archive/2017/01/states-see-a-new-wave-of-transgender-bathroom-bills/512453/
[https://perma.cc/G2Y8-HNZK] (discussing efforts to enact similar legislation in
Texas, Virginia, and Kentucky).
7. Purple states—also known as battleground or swing states—are the states
that the major candidates in the last few presidential elections have most
vigorously contested. See generally Fred M. Shelley & Ashley M. Hitt, Purple
States in the 2016 Presidential Election, 13 GEOGRAPHY TEACHER 124 (2016).
For a detailed account of state preemption of local minimum wage, paid sick
leave, and antidiscrimination laws, see NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN
AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (2017), http://www.nlc
.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UEX-4GF8]. Recent prominent firearms preemption
laws include Florida’s 2011 law that imposed liability on local officials who
enforce gun restrictions beyond those mandated by state law, see 2011 Fla. Laws
109 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.33), and Arizona’s similarly aggressive
statewide preemption of local firearms regulation in 2016. 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws
ch. 132 (amending ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3108) (allowing court to impose
fines up to $50,000 on cities that violate state law and terminate local employees).
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where states and the federal government either obstruct action or fail to act
can only be expected to increase.8 In taking on these issues, cities are
addressing subjects or using modes of regulation that are not unique to
local government. Public health and climate change are hardly “local”
issues, yet cities are attempting to regulate these areas even if they are
outside any “traditional” municipal domain of regulation.9
Taking the “urban disadvantage” as a given, this Article posits that
local lawmaking in urban areas may serve as a modest corrective and shift
the cumulative local, state, and national legal framework back toward the
views of the national median voter. Were local, state, and federal
lawmaking merely layers of sediment, the ability of local lawmaking to
serve as a corrective to state and national deficiencies would be limited
primarily by matters of scale. For instance, if residents of urban areas
prefer stricter gun control, as most do, they could simply add such
restrictions to the pre-existing national and state regulatory layers. The
effectiveness of this extra layer of regulation might be limited by the
ability of guns to slip through city and state lines, but cities would at least
be able to impose a more preferable regulatory regime within their own
boundaries.10
Cities’ limited geographical jurisdiction, however, is not the only or
even primary limitation on the effectiveness of their regulatory choices.
Rather, the frequent preemption of city authority by Congress and
especially state legislatures prohibits local governments from layering or
reducing additional regulation when they see fit. This preemption has
8. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization,
2016 BYU L. REV. 177, 181–82; Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public
Health?, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219 (2014) [hereinafter Why Innovate?]; Matthew
J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional
Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 375–82 (2008);
Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253,
259–60 (2004).
9. For skepticism of the notion that cities even have a “traditional” policy
domain, see Why Innovate?, supra note 8, 1222–23. As an example, consider civil
rights efforts in 1950s at the local level. See John R. Thompson v. Dist. of Columbia,
203 F.2d 579, 599–600 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (citing numerous city ordinances prohibiting
racial discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations); see also
Pamela H. Rice & Milton Greenberg, Municipal Protection of Human Rights, 1952
WIS. L. REV. 679 (1952) (revealing that, as of 1952, a handful of cities had
antidiscrimination ordinances that applied to private employment).
10. Court-recognized substantive constitutional restraints, of course, also
limit city policy choices. E.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
(holding that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is an individual right that
can be enforced against states and cities).
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become particularly frequent, impactful, and noteworthy in states where
the urban–rural divide is strongest. It may soon become more common at
the federal level as well. With the threat of state legislative, congressional,
and presidential override, therefore, local governments are highly
constrained in how they can implement their residents’ preferred policies.
If preemptive action represented the median view of the nation’s or
states’ cumulative voters, including urban residents, such preemption
would be relatively unproblematic. Local control would be usurped, but it
is not uncommon or remarkable for the level of government representing
the larger geographical unit and the higher number of people to have the
final say. Because the federal and state lawmaking processes are structured
so as to underrepresent the urban viewpoint, however, there is good reason
to question the democratic legitimacy of preemption, particularly when
targeted at large and densely populated urban areas.
Interestingly, local government law holds out some promise that city
enactments might be protected from state legislative override. In some
states, courts interpret the state constitution to carve out a sphere of “local”
issues in which the actions of the local government are immune to or more
robustly protected from state legislative override.11 The United States
Supreme Court famously called this system of home rule “imperium in
imperio,” or an “empire within an empire,” in the late 19th century.12 In
states with such a system of home rule, court-enforced immunity to
preemption from state override is usually rooted in the state constitution.
A legislative decision to override local authority, therefore, might run
afoul of this protection; hence, “imperio” home rule is sometimes also
referred to as “constitutional home rule.”13
Although only a few states employ a pure “imperio” form of home
rule today, elements of the approach remain in more states than is
commonly recognized. At its core, constitutional home rule rests on a
judicially defined distinction between “statewide” and “local” matters,

11. See Appendix B (listing such states).
12. St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893); see also City
of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Orleans Levee Dist., 640 So. 2d 237,
241–42 (La. 1994) (reviewing the “imperio” model of home rule).
13. In this sense, “constitutional home rule” has a more specific meaning than
merely a home rule provision rooted in a state’s constitution. Many state
constitutions provide for the power to legislate at the local level, but only a subset
thereof have been interpreted to provide immunity also to state legislative
override. It is this smaller subset to which “constitutional home rule” refers as
used in this Article. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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with only the latter being immune to preemption.14 Courts have long struggled
to articulate this distinction in a neutral, principled fashion, leading many
states to abandon the system for “legislative” home rule, wherein the
legislature may preempt all matters.15 Nonetheless, constitutional home rule
or some version of it stubbornly persists, particularly with respect to local
decisions regarding the structure of municipal government or municipal
employment. Many states instead or in addition recognize a softer version of
constitutional home rule, requiring that state preemption be of a certain form,
and often substance, to override city enactments legally. In some states, for
instance, local enactments may be immune to state legislative preemption if
the potentially preemptive statute is deemed not to address a matter of
“statewide” or “general” concern.16 In other states, courts purport to inquire
only as to legislative intent to preempt, but often consider the domain of
municipal regulation that would be preempted as a factor in their analysis.17
As currently enforced, constitutional home rule is a somewhat awkward
and incomplete remedy for the urban disadvantage. Constitutional home rule
is often seen as a way of protecting a local minority from the will of the
statewide majority, usually on matters deemed to have little effect on the rest
of the state’s community, such as the local form of government.18 In the
current environment, however, much statewide legislation does not actually
represent the will of the statewide majority. Hence, constitutional home rule

14. Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and
Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2009) (noting that
constitutional home rule “center[s] on the divide between local and statewide
affairs”).
15. See, e.g., City of La Grande v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1213–
14 (Or. 1978) (“A search for a predominant state or local interest in the ‘subject
matter’ of legislation can only substitute for the political process . . . the court’s
own political judgment whether the state or the local policy should prevail.”).
Although the La Grande majority did not so admit, the approach to home rule
pronounced by that opinion was a sharp departure from a prior Oregon Supreme
Court opinion, State ex rel. Heinig v. Milwaukie, 373 P.2d 680 (Or. 1962), that
essentially embraced a judicially enforced “local”–“statewide” subject matter
distinction. See La Grande, 576 P.2d at 1224 (Tongue, J., dissenting) (accusing
the majority of overruling Heinig).
16. See Appendix B (listing these states).
17. E.g., Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 99 (Or. 2005) (holding that state marriage
law preempted county same-sex marriage policy because of state’s historic
interest in regulating this subject).
18. E.g., Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 A.2d 1234, 1242 (Pa. 2004)
(“[M]atters affecting merely the personnel and administration” of Philadelphia
“are of no concern to citizens elsewhere.”).
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now ironically might serve as a device for protecting policies that appeal to
a statewide majority from override by a legislature that represents a minority.
The overarching concern of this project is the effect of anti-majoritarian
lawmaking on local policy choice. Hence, across-the-board constitutional
home rule for every city or county in a state might compound the urban
disadvantage should it benefit rural and exurban municipalities whose
residents’ views are already more than adequately represented in the
legislative process. Constitutional home rule, therefore, is a potential doubleedged sword. Its ability to ameliorate the urban disadvantage depends on the
details of that disadvantage in a particular state and which municipalities
may avail themselves of constitutional home rule.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the impact of the
urban disadvantage on federal preemption and possible doctrinal remedies
thereto. Any potential remedies run into two hard-and-fast federal
constitutional rules: first, that all states are to be treated equally; and
second, that cities and states are conflated under federal preemption
analysis. If committed to curing the urban disadvantage, the Supreme
Court might reconsider these doctrines, but this Article takes these
doctrines as a given.
Part II of the Article then explores the doctrines that grant and limit
local power at the state level, fleshing out constitutional home rule in more
detail. Part III explores the possibility of using constitutional home rule to
help cure the urban disadvantage that exists in many state legislatures. Part
III also highlights the peril of constitutional home rule inadvertently
strengthening populations in areas whose views are already sufficiently
represented, if not overrepresented, at the national and state levels. Part IV
turns the lens of the Article’s analysis to local government itself and asks
whether its structural design can bear the responsibility that would
accompany the power to enact legislation that is immune to state
legislative override. Finally, Part V examines what effect an emboldened
constitutional home rule, which technically and most directly affects state–
local relations, might have on the federal order.
I. REMEDYING THE URBAN DISADVANTAGE IN THE FEDERAL ORDER
Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1 articulated at length the manner in
which the U.S. Senate, House of Representatives, and state legislatures
frequently and systematically underrepresent the views of urban voters.19
This Part summarizes that account before analyzing the implications for
the urban disadvantage at the federal level. Proceeding from the premise
19. See Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1.
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of one-person, one-vote, the Senate greatly disadvantages more populous
(“larger”) states. The state of California, with 39,000,000 people, receives
two senators, just as the state of Wyoming does with fewer than 600,000
people. This underrepresentation ratio of 66 to 1 makes the Senate one of
the most malapportioned legislative bodies—from the standpoint of oneperson, one-vote—in the world.20 Proportionally, more underrepresented
states are urbanized.21 That the Senate’s composition hurts urban areas in
pursuing these areas’ policy goals is a straightforward conclusion.
In contrast to the Senate, the U.S. House roughly complies with oneperson, one-vote.22 Nonetheless, the uneven geographic distribution of
voter ideology, combined with the prevailing use of winner-take-all,
reasonably compact, contiguous districts, substantially dilutes the urban
voice in the chamber. Political scientists have demonstrated that the
dynamic of packing like-minded voters into small districts frequently
occurs with respect to “left-leaning,” urban voters in many populous
states.23 In states such as Florida, the urban-favored political party, the
Democratic Party, receives far fewer seats in the state legislature than its
total, statewide vote count would predict because its voters are primarily
packed into small urban districts.24 In other words, Democratic candidates
win these districts 90–10, while Republicans win suburban, exurban, and
rural districts 60–40. Aided by intentional, political gerrymandering
perpetrated by Republican-dominated state legislatures in many states, this
dynamic has also greatly influenced the composition of the U.S. House of
Representatives in recent years. Democratic candidates, for instance, won
the total vote count by more than 1,400,000 votes in 2012, yet Republicans
20. See id. at 308 n.86 (noting that only Argentina, Brazil, and Russia violate
one-person, one-vote more than the U.S. Senate).
21. See infra notes 47 and accompanying text.
22. The House deviates slightly from one-person, one-vote first because of
the requirement that every state have at least one representative, and second,
because of the fact that districts may not cross state lines. Neither of these factors,
however, systematically militates against the interests of large states. See Urban
Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 322 (“The rounding errors that result from House
apportionment do not systematically favor small states.”).
23. See Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering:
Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 264
(2013); Jonathan A. Rodden, The Long Shadow of the Industrial Revolution:
Political Geography and the Representation of the Left 138 (Mar. 25, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), http://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/wp/shadow.pdf.
24. Chen & Rodden, supra note 23, at 264 (“[I]n contemporary Florida and
several other urbanized states, voters are arranged in geographic space in such a
way that traditional districting principles of contiguity and compactness will
generate substantial electoral bias in favor of the Republican Party.”).
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maintained a seat count majority of 234 to 201.25 Pointing to the history of
the Democratic Party in the 20th century, Rodden argues that even when
the urban-favored political party wins a seat majority, it achieves this
margin only by relying on “moderate” representatives in swing, suburban
districts, thus resulting in an ideologically incoherent majority.26 In an
exhaustive study, Rodden demonstrates that the phenomenon of urban
underrepresentation is hardly uniquely American; it is common in any
country that relies on a “first-past-the-post” system of representation using
compact and contiguous districts, which is a more common practice in
former British colonies.27
The urban disadvantage would not be nearly as important if there were
not strong ideological divisions between urban and rural or exurban voters.
Such divisions exist on many policy matters, however. Urban residents
generally favor stronger gun control; proportionally more spending on
public transit, including rail; higher minimum wages; antidiscrimination
protection for sexual minorities; stronger environmental protections;
looser regulation of marijuana; a more forgiving approach to illegal
immigration; and a more secular form of government.28 In the last 10 to
20 years, the national party most receptive to these urban political
priorities has been the Democratic Party.29 Barack Obama won two

25. Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 323.
26. Rodden, supra note 23, at 138, 167.
27. See generally id. (examining numerous countries that are former British
possessions, such as New Zealand, Australia, and Canada).
28. See Loey Nunning, 6 Big Differences That Turn City Dwellers into Liberals,
CRACKED (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.cracked.com/blog/6-ways-big-cities-turn-youliberal-converts-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/43SU-K7NN] (explaining why urban
voters prefer higher minimum wages, more public transit, and looser enforcement of
immigration laws); Robert Mikos, Marijuana Localism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
719, 735 (2015) (noting that opposition to marijuana legalization in states that have
held ballot initiatives has been more concentrated in thinly populated counties). On
the urban preference for secular values, see Rodden, supra note 23, at 10–11, 96–
99. On big cities’ comparative willingness to protect rights of sexual minorities, see
Reid Wilson, Study: Big Cities Most Likely to Have Progressive Gay-Rights Laws,
WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp
/2013/11/19/study-big-cities-most-likely-to-have-progressive-gay-rights-laws/?utm
_term=.141b6a4f5bd1 [https://perma.cc/RS3A-DBYM] (“The nation’s largest cities
are most likely to have laws that benefit gays and lesbians, while smaller cities and
those in the South are least likely to accommodate homosexuals . . . .”).
29. Drew DeSilver, The Growing Democratic Domination of America’s
Largest Counties, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: FACT TANK (July 21, 2016), http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/21/the-growing-democratic-domination-of-
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elections representing most of these values in large part because of strong
support from urban voters. Indeed, because all states but two award their
electoral college votes on a statewide rather than district basis, urban areas
are at less of a disadvantage in electing the chief executive than they are
in determining the composition of the Senate or House.30 The inability of
President Obama to enact his agenda in the face of a hostile Congress,
despite handily winning re-election in 2012, was due in no small part to
the urban disadvantage in Congress.
Donald Trump’s election in 2016 ushers in a new era for the urban–
rural divide at the federal level. As in previous elections, the urban–rural
split was pronounced. Trump won overwhelmingly in smaller and less
densely populated counties, while Hillary Clinton overwhelmingly won
the largest and most densely populated cities.31 For instance, Clinton won
Manhattan by 579,013 to 64,929, or 87% to 10%; San Francisco by
345,084 to 37,688, or 84% to 9%; and Philadelphia by 584,025 to 108,748,
or 82% to 15%. Even in “red” states, the pattern of the Democratic
candidate winning large cities held; in Texas, for instance, Clinton easily
won the counties in which Dallas, Houston, Austin, and San Antonio sit.32
Although it would be convenient for this Article’s thesis to attribute
Trump’s victory to the Electoral College’s amplification of small-state
power—Wyoming, for instance, receives one-eighteenth of California’s
electoral votes despite having one-sixty-sixth of its population—it appears
that Trump’s victory had a different cause. Trump won the Electoral
College because he barely won several key swing states—Florida,
Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.33 Each of those states, like all the
other states except Maine and Nebraska, awards its electoral votes on a
winner-take-all basis.34 Hence, despite nearly tying Trump in those four
states, Clinton took zero electoral votes while Trump took 75.

nations-largest-counties/ [https://perma.cc/LZ27-XGAM] (noting Democratic
“dominan[ce] in big cities”).
30. Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 30–35.
31. See Lazaro Gamio, Urban and Rural America Are Becoming Increasingly
Polarized, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics
/politics/2016-election/urban-rural-vote-swing/ [https://perma.cc/4BYK-SYZK].
32. Clinton won Dallas County 61%–35%, Harris County in Houston 54%–42%,
and Bexar County in San Antonio 54%–41%, all despite losing Texas 52%–43%.
33. Nate Cohn, Why Trump Had an Edge in the Electoral College, N.Y. TIMES:
THE UPSHOT (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/upshot/whytrump-had-an-edge-in-the-electoral-college.html [https://perma.cc/9BK7-2ZM7].
34. See About the Electors, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.,
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/electors.html#selection
[https://perma.cc/V8PF-RH9P] (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
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Regardless, the next two years will highlight extraordinary tension
between the federal government, which tilts ideologically away from the
preferences of the median national voter, and those states and cities that
tilt in the other direction. California, for instance, has indicated that it
intends to fight the federal government on matters from immigration
enforcement to climate change.35 Leaders of large cities like Chicago, New
York, Portland, and San Francisco have pledged to resist the efforts of a
Trump administration to deport undocumented aliens.36 Several cities have
already sued the Trump administration regarding its plans to cut off federal
funding to “sanctuary cities.”37 Already, residents of urban areas are
turning out in the thousands to protest President Trump’s first moves on
immigration.38 In other matters, such as climate change, health care, and
LGBT rights, local governments and large states are also likely to resist
attempts by the federal government to preempt.
A. States Suffer Urban Disadvantage Too
Vis-à-vis the federal government, it is not just residents of large cities
that bear the brunt of Senate malapportionment. All residents of large
states, even those in rural areas, suffer to some extent from the federal
government’s composition. The larger the state, the more all of its
residents suffer from Senate malapportionment. California, for instance,
with over 12% of the nation’s population, wields only 2% of the Senate’s
voting strength and only 10% of the Electoral College, and therefore
suffers at the hands of states with amplified power like Alaska, Idaho, and
35. Adam Nagourney, California Hires Eric Holder as Legal Bulwark Against
Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04
/us/california-eric-holder-donald-trump.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TBD4-S3SU]
(citing California state senate leader as predicting that California would challenge
Trump administration on the environment, immigration, and criminal justice).
36. Ruairí Arrieta-Kenna, Sanctuary Cities Stand Firm Against Trump, POLITICO
(Dec. 12, 2016, 5:14 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/sanctuary-citiestrump-immigration-232449 [https://perma.cc/KA7Y-GMDH]. On January 31, 2017,
San Francisco filed the first lawsuit by a city challenging President Trump’s threat to
withhold federal funds. See generally Complaint, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No.
3:17-cv-00485 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017).
37. See generally Complaint, City of Chelsea v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10214GAO (D. Mass. filed Feb. 10, 2017); Complaint, City & County of San Francisco
v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017).
38. Jonathan Martin, As Democrats Take to the Streets, Lawmakers Rush to Keep
Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/politics
/donald-trump-democrats-backlash-executive-orders.html [https://perma.cc/YE59Y2K4].
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Montana.39 All factors being equal, therefore, the more populous the state,
the more disadvantaged it is by the Senate and to a much lesser extent the
Electoral College.
All factors are not equal, however, with respect to policy goals. For
instance, voters in California and Rhode Island, which is vastly
overrepresented in Senate, likely favor stricter gun control and environmental
regulation.40 Voters in Texas, which is vastly underrepresented, and Idaho
generally prefer the opposite.41 If large states have enough like-minded, smallstate allies, then perhaps the Senate’s gross deviation from one-person, onevote is of no significance, at least with respect to policy goals rather than nonideological “pork” spending.42
Although large states do have small-state allies, they do not have
enough to mute their disadvantage in the Senate on many issues. Voter
ideology correlates more significantly with density of a state’s population
than with absolute population.43 Although Rhode Island’s population is
tiny in absolute terms, it is the second-densest population in the nation.44
California’s is the eleventh-densest population.45 Likewise, although
Texas is the second most populous state, its population is in the bottom

39. In addition, Washington, D.C. residents, who number more than 670,000,
suffer from receiving no representation despite having more residents than either
Vermont or Wyoming. For more discussion of this and detailed data, see Urban
Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 308–10.
40. In a 2014 ranking of states’ ideology, Gallup ranked California and Rhode
Island among the most liberal, or at least among the least conservative. See Frank
Newport, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana Most Conservative States, GALLUP
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181505/mississippi-alabama-louisianaconservative-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/UKR6-ZQUU].
41. Id. (ranking Idaho as “most conservative” and Texas as “above-average
conservative”).
42. Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 20 & n.88.
43. See Richard Florida & Sara Johnson, What Republicans Are Really Up Against:
Population Density, ATLANTIC: CITYLAB (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/poli
tics/2012/11/what-republicans-are-really-against-population-density/3953/
[https://perma.cc/YL3Y-MTMW] (including a graph of 2012 presidential election
results plotted against population density); but see Richard Florida, What Makes a Dense
Urban County Vote Republican?, A TLANTIC : C ITYLAB (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.citylab.com/politics/2015/02/what-makes-a-dense-urban-county-vote-re
publican/385299/ [https://perma.cc/SC4Z-89E4] (discussing outliers to this trend).
44. Population numbers are based on the 2014 Census estimate, Population
Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/state
/totals/2014/ [https://perma.cc/T9AF-FU34] (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
45. Id.
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half of population density.46 Because there is a rough correlation between
a state’s absolute population and population density, large states are
overall hurt by the Senate’s composition. Despite some outliers, most large
states are relatively densely populated. Of the top 17 states—all those that
are disadvantaged by the two-senator rule—11 are also within the top 17
of population density.47 Likewise, the ten least densely populated states
are among the 18 least-populous states.48
As a result of the House’s and Senate’s compositions, it is exceedingly
difficult for a popular majority drawn mostly from densely populated areas
to promote its affirmative governance agenda. A majority of voters
nationally may desire a tighter national gun control regime. If this majority
draws disproportionate support from voters in the more populous states,
or those in urban areas, it will have much less success at achieving its
legislative goals than if its support is spread evenly among and within
states. Urban-favored proposals, therefore, need an even larger reservoir
of support to be viable politically than do those favored by residents more
diffusely distributed.49
Residents of urbanized states are also often on the losing side of
national policies pushed forward by legislators from less densely
populated areas that preempt the regulatory goals of large states. Because
of the Senate’s malapportionment, it is possible for legislation that enjoys
support from senators representing only the 30 smallest states—which
constitute only 24% of the national population—to displace state policies,
even those of the largest states.50 This concern is not just hypothetical. For
instance, a state might prefer to maintain tort liability for firearms
manufacturers, even those that operate primarily within the state. In 2005,
however, Congress passed a federal law, the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”), with strong support from small-state
legislators that preempts any state regime to the contrary.51 Indeed, the
46. Id.
47. Id. These states include (followed by total and density ranks): California
(1, 11); Florida (3, 8); New York (4, 7); Illinois (5, 12); Pennsylvania (6, 9); Ohio
(7, 10); Georgia (8, 17); North Carolina (9, 15); Michigan (10, 18); New Jersey
(11, 1); Virginia (14, 12); and Massachusetts (15, 3).
48. Id. These states include: Alaska (48, 50); Wyoming (50, 49); Montana
(44, 48); North Dakota (47, 47); South Dakota (46, 46); New Mexico (36, 45);
Idaho (39, 44); Nebraska (37, 43); Nevada (35, 42); and Kansas (34, 41).
49. For recent examples of this phenomenon, see Urban Disadvantage, supra
note 1, at 312–15.
50. Id. at 314.
51. Pub. L. No. 109–92, 119 Stat. 2095 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903
(2012)).
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Senate passed the law by the seemingly overwhelming, filibuster-proof
majority of 65–31.52 When accounting for the populations of the states
whose senators voted for the legislation, however, it passed by a much
more modest 58%–42%.53 That 58% majority would not overcome the 60vote filibuster requirement if the Senate were apportioned on the basis of
population. Moreover, any future Senate with a majority more sympathetic
to gun control would almost certainly never be able to overcome the
filibuster or even gain a majority of Senate votes to reverse the law given
the small-state advantage.
Likewise, the House of Representatives passed the PLCAA by a
seemingly overwhelming vote of 283–144, or 65%–33%. Much of the
bipartisan support for the bill came from “blue-dog” Democrats
representing more rural and exurban areas.54 Many urban-centered
representatives, both Democrat and Republican, voted against the
legislation.55 The overwhelming vote in favor may have represented the
views of a majority of the American people, but this majority’s legislative
clout was amplified by the advantages rural and exurban areas reap
through a system of compact, contiguous, first-past-the-post district
representation—which was explained in Part 1 of this series.
Unlike the PLCAA, in which Congress’s intent to preempt was clear
and express, many other instances of federal preemption are more
muddled. Preemption often results from a judicial interpretation that
Congress “intended” to preempt state and local regulatory regimes without
expressly saying so.56 In other instances, preemption is a consequence of
52. S.B. 397, 109th Cong. (2005).
53. See Appendix A.
54. See S. 397 (109th): Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/109-2005/h534 [https://perma
.cc/XRL6-ZFE2] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). For instance, all Democrat
representatives from Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, and all but one from New York, which are all among the most urbanized states,
voted against the bill. Democratic Representatives representing rural parts of Georgia,
Maine, Michigan, Oregon, California, South Dakota, and many other states, by
contrast, voted in favor. Id. See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Congress Passes New Legal
Shield for Gun Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com
/2005/10/21/politics/congress-passes-new-legal-shield-for-gun-industry.html [https:
//perma.cc/3JCJ-Y8VF] (noting “considerable Democratic support” for the bill).
55. See S. 397 (109th): Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, supra
note 54, (counting four Republican “no” votes, including from the Connecticut
suburbs of New York City, suburban Chicago, and relatively urbanized
Delaware).
56. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1141
(2007) [hereinafter Intrastate Preemption]. Technically, “field” preemption and
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agency action that flows, however imperfectly, from congressional
delegation.57 Even if preemption in these instances is less clearly a result
of intentional congressional action, it still flows from the structure that
disadvantages highly and densely populated states. In theory, agency
officials appointed by a majoritarian-elected president—such as President
Obama, who twice won the popular vote with a majority of the vote—
might take democracy-remediating concerns into account when
promulgating regulations.58 Even if acting so boldly, however, they would
do so under the shadow of the Congress that delegates them their power.59
Any attempt to do so, moreover, would face inevitable challenge before
federal courts applying both the organic statute and the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) passed by Congress.60
B. Assessing Big-State Immunity to Preemption
One potential solution to preemptive national policies that reflect the
urban disadvantage in national lawmaking would be for the federal
judiciary to enforce constitutional immunity tailored on the basis of
population. The Supreme Court has for years wrestled with whether the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, or just the structure of the Constitution’s
enumerated grants of power to Congress, guarantee states a reserve of
power with which the federal government may not interfere. Dating back
to National League of Cities v. Usery,61 progressing to Garcia v. SAMTA,62
“conflict” preemption are separate forms of Congress preempting state law, each
with slightly different emphases. In practice, however, the line between the two
is fuzzy. Id. (first citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990),
and then citing French v. Pan Am. Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989)).
57. See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1933, 1948–83 (2008); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency
Preemption, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 695 (2008) [hereinafter Presumption Against
Preemption]; Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV.
737, 765 (2004) [hereinafter Chevron and Preemption]; Ernest A. Young,
Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. Rev. 869 (2008).
58. Cf. Chevron and Preemption, supra note 57, at 769–71 (discussing
presidential control over executive branch agencies as a means of ensuring their
democratic responsiveness).
59. Id. at 790 (agency must follow requirements imposed by Congress).
60. Id. at 794 (“[A]n agency’s reliance on federalism concerns apparently
uncontemplated by the statutory scheme thus could present legal problems [under
the Administrative Procedure Act.]”).
61. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
62. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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and illustrated vividly again by NFIB v. Sebelius,63 the Court has struggled
to articulate any principled method for how, or even whether, states may
be immunized from federal regulatory mandates.64 To remedy the urban
disadvantage in federal lawmaking, stronger Tenth Amendment protections
for California than for Montana as a way to compensate for California’s
disadvantage in the federal order might be desirable.
David Dana has offered a “weaker” version of this proposal, arguing
that the popular support a policy enjoys as reflected through the populations
of the states that have adopted it ought to influence the Supreme Court’s
adjudication of preemption questions when congressional intent is unclear.65
Like any judicial test that incorporates political analysis, there would be
major questions about the courts’ capacity to administer it.66 How many
small states must “gang up” on large states to trigger the extra scrutiny?
What would the congressional vote count need to be? How many large states
need be affected? Could large states object when a regime was imposed on
top of whatever pre-existing mixture of laws they had before, or only when
a specific positive enactment was displaced? These are no doubt difficult
questions, but they are not necessarily more difficult by any order of
magnitude than the questions associated with modes of analysis the
Supreme Court has embraced over the years, such as the scrutiny of
legislation that burdens “discrete and insular minorities”67 or whether
government action “endorses” religion in the eyes of a “reasonable
observer.”68
The more serious doctrinal problem with both Dana’s proposal and the
stronger version offered herein is the Supreme Court’s strong presumption
63. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
64. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1,
51 n.308 (2013) (citing Sebelius as an attempt to revive the “discarded” doctrine
of “dual federalism”).
65. David Dana, Democratizing the Law of Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
507 (2008).
66. Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 893 (2009)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (listing numerous difficulties of courts engaging in
political analysis in deciding whether campaign contributions require judicial
recusal).
67. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See
David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251,
1264–67 (reviewing criticisms of the famous footnote’s mode of analysis).
68. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–92 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). For criticism of Justice O’Connor’s test, which became the prevailing
mode for analyzing Establishment Clause claims against publicly sponsored
religious displays, see, e.g., Paula Abrams, The Reasonable Believer: Faith,
Formalism, and Endorsement of Religion, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1537 (2010).
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in favor of treating all states equally. Often referred to as the “equalfooting doctrine,” the principle holds that once admitted to the union, each
state must be treated the same way as every other, particularly with respect
to matters of sovereignty.69 In Coyle v. Smith, for instance, the Supreme
Court invalidated the section of Oklahoma’s Enabling Act, passed by
Congress, that limited where the newly admitted state could put its capital
for a certain period of time.70 The Coyle Court cited the importance of states
in the union being “equal in power, dignity, and authority, each competent
to exert that residuum of sovereignty note delegated to the United States by
the Constitution itself.”71
The Court has permitted Congress to treat states differently when
compelling circumstances justify it, but it has expressed discomfort with
such treatment. Indeed, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Court cited Coyle in
invalidating the Voting Rights Act’s requirement that certain states undergo
the arduous preclearance procedure when making voting changes.72 The
Supreme Court usually applies the equal-footing doctrine when reviewing
acts of Congress challenged on other substantive constitutional grounds, but
it presumably binds the Court’s own jurisprudence as well. There may be
good normative reasons, particularly in an era of a president elected despite
losing the popular vote by almost 3,000,000 for California, for example, to
receive special treatment in preemption jurisprudence. Any judicially
imposed democracy-remediating immunity doctrine, however, would have
to overcome this significant doctrinal obstacle.73
Even putting aside the equal-footing doctrine, there may be institutional
problems with tasking federal judges with remedying the urban
disadvantage through stronger immunity for large-state enactments.
Although they enjoy life tenure, members of the judiciary are confirmed by
the malapportioned Senate. The Senate can be expected, therefore, to screen
judges for any such sympathies; small-state senators, in particular, would be
expected to object. Further, judges usually conceptualize their role in
preemption decisions as one of interpreting dutifully Congress’s “intent.”74
69. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S.Ct. 1863, 1871 n.4 (2016)
(reiterating the importance of the “equal-footing” doctrine); see also John Hanna,
Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1951).
70. 221 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1911) (citing Oklahoma Enabling Act of 1906,
Pub. L. No. 59–234, 34 Stat. 267).
71. Id. at 567.
72. 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2623–24 (2013) (quoting Northwest Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)) (“[T]here is . . . a ‘fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty among the States.’”).
73. See Dana, supra note 65, at 512–13.
74. See supra note 56.

1062

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

To ask federal judges to engage in a completely different sort of endeavor
would upend this judicial self-image.
Finally, in certain large states, such as Texas, at least formally
disadvantaged by the Electoral College and the Senate’s composition, the
views of the median voter may be more in agreement with the legislative
output produced by the federal government. In other “purple” states such as
Pennsylvania, Florida, and North Carolina, the median voter may hold views
to the left of the legislative output of both Congress and their own state
legislatures because of both intentional and unintentional gerrymandering.75
Hence, providing bolstered immunity from federal override to a large state
like Florida or North Carolina might actually reinforce the urban
disadvantage. By contrast, a stronger normative—if not doctrinal—case for
bolstered immunity applies to two types of states: (1) those where state
legislative gerrymandering is muted, such as in states that have removed
political considerations from districting, like Arizona and California;76 and (2)
those whose cumulative political preferences are relatively evenly distributed
throughout the state, such as New Jersey and Massachusetts.77
C. Assessing Big-City Immunity to Preemption
If large and densely populated states are disadvantaged by the federal
legislative process, large and densely populated cities are, in many ways,
even more disadvantaged. New York City, for instance, with a population
of 8,500,000, has more people than all but 11 states.78 Nonetheless, any
local ordinance the city enacts can be preempted by a Congress that
overstates the preferences of voters in sparsely populated states and rural
areas. To overcome the filibuster in the Senate, a bill supported by senators
representing the least possible number of people would still account for
24% of the 50-state population, or approximately 75,000,000 people. The
idea of 75,000,000 people preempting 8,400,000 may not seem
problematic at all.
On closer look, however, the cumulative disadvantage cities suffer in
the federal order is more problematic for two reasons. First, unlike states,
they receive no institutional representation within Congress.79 States enjoy
75. See Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 336–44.
76. Id. at 306 & n.77.
77. Id. at 332.
78. Virginia, at 8.4 million, is close behind. Annual Estimates of the Resident
Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: AM. FACTFINDER,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/ productview.xhtml?src=
bkmk [https://perma.cc/JA4Q-XBB9] (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
79. Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 51–55.
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“political safeguards” that help prevent Congress from ever attempting to
preempt a unique state policy in the first place, whereas cities enjoy no
such advantage.80 Second, large cities are often interested in the same
types of policies as each other because of their dense, diverse, and
cosmopolitan populations. Any particular city policy that Congress
preempts, therefore, may represent a beachhead of emerging urban support
for a policy. For instance, when Congress passed the PLCAA, it had the
effect of nullifying city legislation that would hold gun manufacturers
strictly liable for harm caused by their products. Although only one city—
Washington, D.C.—had passed such an ordinance by the time of the
PLCAA’s passage, it is possible that more cities would have done so over
time.81 Further, even absent preemption, like-minded cities have no formal
mechanism for banding together to pursue policy choices; states, by
contrast, may form bi- or multi-state compacts with congressional
approval.82
When viewed en masse, urban America represents a large, relatively
disempowered segment of the general population. In the 297 cities that
have populations of greater than 100,000, 90,000,000 people live; in the
81 cities with populations over 250,000, 58,000,000 people live; and in the
11 cities with populations over 1,000,000, 25,600,000 people live.83 The
number of people in the 11 largest cities is greater than the total living in
the 17 smallest states.84 Yet the 24,000,000 people in the smallest 17 states
are represented by 34 senators—enough to block a treaty—while the
nearly 26,000,000 living in the 11 largest cities are represented by a mere
12 senators, those from New York, Arizona, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
California, and Texas, whom, of course, they share with the residents of
the rest of their states.85

80. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954).
81. See Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990, 37 D.C.
Reg. 8482 (Mar. 6, 1991) (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2551.01, 7-2551.02,
7-2551.03 (2017)). On the complicated legislative history of this act, see Markus
Boser, Go Ahead, State, Make Them Pay: An Analysis of Washington, D.C.’s
Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 313, 313 n.5 (1992). The D.C. Court of Appeals held that the PLCAA
preempted Washington’s liability act. See District of Columbia v. Berretta U.S.A.
Corp., 940 A.2d 163 (D.C. Ct. App. 2008).
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. See generally JEFFREY LITWAK, INTERSTATE
COMPACT LAW: CASES & MATERIALS (2014).
83. These calculations are based on Population Estimates, supra note 44.
84. See id.
85. Id.
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Even if by this measure large cities are more disadvantaged than large
states, current federal constitutional doctrine again provides no comfort to
cities. Under black-letter Supremacy Clause doctrine, local enactments are
treated the same as state laws for preemption purposes.86 Arguably, local
enactments should receive less judicial protection from federal override
because the Constitution’s “immunity-granting” provisions, like the Tenth
Amendment, refer only to states, not localities.87 Annie Decker has argued
that in passing federal legislation, Congress should be more careful about
whether it preempts both state and local law or only one or the other.88
Decker offers several good reasons why Congress might choose not to
preempt local law even when it preempts state law.89 Given that the urban
disadvantage is part and parcel of Congress’s design, however, Congress
is likely institutionally incapable of wielding its preemption power in a
manner that would remedy the disadvantage. Moreover, although there is
no “equal-footing doctrine” for states, there is no precedent yet for the
notion that large-city enactments might be more immune to federal
preemption than those of small cities. Such an approach follows from the
normative analysis of this project, but it would be groundbreaking and,
again, the federal judiciary may be ill-suited to administer it.90
II. CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE OR “MINI TENTH AMENDMENTS”
In contradistinction to their place in the federal order, local
governments occupy a vaunted place in many state constitutions. “Home
rule” is a protean concept used to describe many different governmental
86. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985) (unanimous opinion) (“[F]or purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the
constitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of
statewide laws.”). In her insightful work analyzing federal preemption of local
law, Annie Decker refers to Hillsborough’s rule as the “conflation axiom.” Annie
Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the State in
Congressional Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 333 (2012).
87. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 955 n.16 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (questioning the extension of Tenth Amendment immunity to local,
rather than state, officials).
88. Decker, supra note 86, at 350 (“Congress should strive to [differentiate
between state and local preemption outcomes] and make clear its intentions for
both levels of government in federal preemption provisions.”).
89. Id. at 351, tbl.1 (listing “allowing site-specific regulation,” “promoting
innovation and intergovernmental learning,” and “enlisting local partners in
federal programs,” as reasons why Congress might prefer not to preempt local law
even as it preempts state law).
90. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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systems that embrace some form of local control, from Ireland to
Washington, D.C.91 In state constitutional law, the term refers to a legal
regime in which cities need not seek state permission before taking action
on a certain subject. For instance, in most “home-rule” states, a city that
wants to enact a paid sick-leave ordinance may do so unless and until the
state legislature says that it may not.92 A home-rule regime stands in
contrast to a state that uses Dillon’s Rule, whereby cities are presumed
powerless unless and until granted express authority by the legislature to
address a particular subject.93 In a Dillon’s Rule state, a city wanting to
adopt paid sick leave would need to point to a specific statutory
authorization from the legislature to sustain the ordinance against legal
attack.
A clear majority of states have some version of home rule for cities
and counties.94 In most of these states, cities are empowered to address
whatever subject they wish, but they may be preempted by the state on
most matters. In some states, like Alaska, the state constitution imposes a
system of pure “legislative supremacy,” or “legislative home rule.”95 That
is, cities enjoy authority to enact whatever they want so long as not
prohibited by state law or the constitution. Legislative home rule is a
misnomer in states like Alaska that also have the initiative system for
statutory matters.96 In these states, “the people”—expressing themselves

91. See, e.g., FRANK WRIGHT, TWO LANDS ON ONE SOIL: ULSTER POLITICS
BEFORE HOME RULE (1996) (discussing home rule in the context of Ireland and
Northern Ireland); District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental ReOrganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93–198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (also known as the
“Home Rule Act”).
92. See JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM, AM. MUN. ASS’N, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1953); NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL
STATE CONSTITUTION § 8.02 (6th ed. rev. 1968).
93. E.g., Early Estates, Inc. v. Hous. Bd. of Review, 174 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1961)
(Providence’s ordinance requiring hot water in residences held ultra vires because
the state had granted the city only the authority to set minimum standards for the
conditions of buildings.).
94. See Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 1109, 1129 (2012) [hereinafter The City and the Private Right of Action]
(tallying 42 “home-rule” states).
95. See ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 11 (“A home rule borough or city may
exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter.”).
96. E.g., id. art. XI, § 1 (“The people may propose and enact laws by the
initiative . . . .”).
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directly through the initiative—are as capable of preempting local power
as is the legislature.97
A. Constitutional, or Imperio, Home Rule as a Provider of Immunity to
State Override
In a significant number of home-rule jurisdictions—approximately
15—the state constitution either explicitly limits the ability of the state
legislature to override certain local enactments, or the state supreme court
has so read the constitution.98 The traditional name for a home-rule regime
that immunizes local action to statewide preemption is “imperio.”99 In a
classic “imperio” regime, the state judiciary divides the realm of local
enactments into matters of local, statewide, or mixed concern. When the
legislature attempts to preempt a “local” matter, the local policy will
prevail. When mixed or statewide, the state law will prevail.
Most states’ home-rule doctrine is a mix of imperio and legislative.
Many states are simply internally inconsistent. In others, the constitutional
text or case law allows for local immunity for certain kinds of local
enactments but not for others. The National League of Cities breaks down
local enactments into four categories: structural, personnel, functional, and
fiscal.100 Structural home rule means control over one’s form of
government.101 This control might mean, for example, deciding how many
city councilors to have, whether those councilors are elected at large or by
district, how long their terms are, and whether they are part-time or fulltime. Personnel authority gives a local government the ability to set
employment policies for its employees.102 Functional authority is perhaps
the most important for this Article’s purposes: it is the ability to regulate
anyone or anything in the jurisdiction, usually under a police-power
grant—for that reason this Article will refer to it as “regulatory.”103
97. See Initiative and Referendum States, N AT’ L C ONF. OF S T. LEGIS .,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states
.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CW3-Q83T] (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) (listing the 14 states
with direct initiative processes).
98. See Appendix B (listing home-rule states with some strain of
jurisprudence like the one described).
99. See supra note 12.
100. Local Government Authority, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org
/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-powers/local-government-author
ity [https://perma.cc/QSM2-CNEN] (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Finally, fiscal authority is the authority to raise revenue, either through
borrowing or taxation, as well as the authority to decide how to spend such
revenue.104
Of the 15 states that recognize home-rule immunity for some types of
enactments, most do so for only one or two of these categories. Structural
and personnel home rule are the areas in which immunity is most
prevalent.105 Fiscal and regulatory home rule are the least common,
although a few states recognize some home rule in the regulatory sphere
for matters denominated “local.”
Imperio home rule has the greatest effect when enshrined in the state
constitution. If local governments’ protections against state override is
merely statutory, legislatures can overrule it. For this reason, imperio
home rule is sometimes also referred to as “constitutional home rule.”106
When constitutionalized, imperio home rule functions like a miniature
version of the strong Tenth Amendment that states’ rights advocates have
championed at the federal level.107 Interestingly, even in states where the
constitutional system of home rule is not self-executing or it expressly
allows the legislature to weaken local authority, the courts have
nonetheless recognized some realm of local enactments that cannot be
overruled by the state legislature.108 Somehow these states have a form of
imperio home rule that is not guaranteed by the state constitution. It may

104. Id.
105. See Appendix B.
106. E.g., Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 1342–45 (reviewing the
framework of “constitutional home rule”).
107. See Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28
HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 1, 9 & n.51 (2000) (contrasting a more “robust” version of
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that “carve[s] out constitutionally significant
spheres of state autonomy” with “a more moderate” doctrine).
108. Examples include Connecticut and Georgia. Connecticut’s home rule is
non-self-executing, see CONN. CONST. art. X, § 1 (“The general assembly shall by
general law delegate such legislative authority as from time to time it deems
appropriate to towns, cities and boroughs . . . .”), and Georgia’s allows the
legislature “to limit, or otherwise regulate the exercise” of county home-rule
authority. GA. CONST. art. IX, §2, para. I(a). Yet in each state, courts hold that the
legislature may not infringe on certain local matters. See Caulfield v. Noble, 420
A.2d 1160, 1165 (Conn. 1979) (“[G]eneral laws pertaining to municipal affairs .
. . do not supersede the provisions of home rule charters or ordinances on the same
subject.”); Johnston v. Hicks, 170 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. 1969) (concluding that Home
Rule Amendment granted counties authority to enact planning and zoning laws
and the general assembly had no authority to override).
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be that home-rule statutes in these states have acquired the aura of a “super
statute.”109
In the handful of states that have some form of imperio home rule for
local regulatory or fiscal enactments, ordinances governing substantive
matters of local concern are immune from statewide legislative override.
In Colorado, this approach is buttressed by the state constitution’s
language that local charters and ordinances involving “local and municipal
matters . . . shall supersede . . . any law of the state in conflict therewith.”110
In these states, the extent of immunity for local regulatory enactments
depends completely on the distinction between “local” and “statewide.”
To articulate this distinction, the Colorado Supreme Court has relied on
several criteria. Most prominent among them are tradition, extraterritorial
effects, and the need for statewide uniformity.111
Of the Colorado Supreme Court’s factors, tradition perhaps is the most
suspect. Even if the “traditional” realm of local government matters could
be adequately catalogued, there is no good reason why cities should be
bound to continue to operate in this realm.112 One of the primary benefits
of home rule is cities’ ability to serve as agents of policy experimentation
and change.113 Confining their actions to a fixed realm of “traditional”
prerogatives severely limits cities’ ability to function as agents of policy
experimentation and change. Similarly, merely because local governments
have “traditionally” operated in a realm, they ought not necessarily be
permitted impunity in their continuing regulation. Land use is an obvious
example. Although it is often considered a “traditional” local concern, the
record of local governments using their authority therein to exclude
“undesirable” uses, like low-income housing, is legion.114
The criteria of extraterritorial impact and the need for statewide
uniformity of regulation have more to be said for them even if they too are
difficult to implement. Many of the states that protect only personnel or
109. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1215 (2001).
110. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
111. See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 572, 580 (Colo.
2016); see also Fraternal Order of Police, Colo. Lodge No. 27 v. City and Cty. of
Denver, 926 P.2d 582, 587 (Colo. 1996) (holding that the regulation of deputy
sheriffs is a local matter that the state may not preempt).
112. Cf. Dana, supra note 65, at 517 (“Even if the traditional state arenas
category [of federalism] were coherent . . . it would be normatively unattractive.
If states are to remain vibrant parts of our democracy, they need to be active in
both traditional and nontraditional spheres . . . .”).
113. See Intrastate Preemption, supra note 56, at 1117–33.
114. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MT. LAUREL (2013).
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structural matters from statewide preemption offer similar reasons for that
approach. In Pennsylvania, for instance, the courts have said that matters
of “personnel and local administration” are of no concern to residents of
the rest of the state—i.e., they have no extraterritorial impact of
significance and there is no need for uniform statewide regulation.115
Within the regulatory sphere, the Colorado Supreme Court has
invoked the extraterritorial and uniformity factors in declaring various city
ordinances, such as local bans on sex offenders and fracking, as regulating
“statewide” matters and, therefore, susceptible to preemption by the
state.116 Laurie Reynolds has extensively analyzed the “extraterritorial
impact” factor.117 She notes that courts applying the factor assess both the
effect of a lone-city ordinance, as well as the possible cumulative effect of
other cities adopting similar ordinances.118 Reynolds concludes that courts
use “extraterritorial impact” as “cover for imposing their own political
assessment of the local laws at issue” and thus argues that it should be
abandoned.119
Reynolds is likely correct that courts strain their institutional capacity
in attempting to assess the “extraterritorial impact” of local laws. Indeed,
when cities address controversial and high-profile issues, any
extraterritorial impact from the city action will necessarily also be difficult
to assess neutrally. Raising the minimum wage in a city, for instance,
whether directly or through other employee-friendly regulation, will have
a negative extraterritorial impact if residents believe that the minimum
wage promotes unemployment. By contrast, if residents believe that a
higher minimum wage lifts all boats, there will be no or little negative
extraterritorial impact. Indeed, there is arguably a positive impact. No
obvious answer to this debate presents itself. Nobel-Prize-winning
economists argue both sides.120 Similarly, if a county loosens gun

115. Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 A.2d 1234, 1242 (Pa. 2004)
(“[M]atters affecting merely the personnel and administration” of Philadelphia
“are of no concern to citizens elsewhere.” (citation omitted)).
116. See Longmont, 369 P.3d at 580–81 (invalidating local fracking ban); City
of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 163 (Colo. 2003).
117. See Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the
Region, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1271 (2009). For additional excellent analysis that
was published just before this paper went to editing, see Stahl, supra note 8, at
213 (analyzing extraterritorial impact and uniformity).
118. Reynolds, supra note 117, at 1278–82.
119. Id. at 1285.
120. See Mike Patton, The Facts on Increasing the Minimum Wage, FORBES (Nov.
26, 2014, 10:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2014/11/26 /the-facts-
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regulations, its voters may argue that they are doing so because allowing
more guns in the hands of law-abiding citizens leads to less crime. Urban
areas in the state are likely to disagree and are also likely to claim that they
will be on the receiving end of the negative externality of loose gun sales.
Does gun regulation really work? Should courts have to answer this
question in order to properly allocate state and local power?
There will, however, be more obvious cases where a city is clearly
seeking to externalize costs to other cities, such as exclusionary zoning
and draconian bans on sex-offender residency. In these instances, courts
employing the imperio approach would likely be correct to label the
matters “statewide.” Indeed, although the Colorado Supreme Court
generally considers zoning a “local” matter,121 it exempts zoning laws that
implicate a “statewide concern.”122 In response to Laurie Reynolds,
Michelle Anderson suggests that rather than abandon the “extraterritorial
impact” factor, courts would do well to discipline it by requiring a showing
of a significant impact outside of the city limits.123 Under Anderson’s
view, courts can still play a useful role in policing the extent of local
authority in imperio regimes in the regulatory sphere.124 As both Reynolds
and Anderson recognize, even when a court categorizes the matter
regulated by an ordinance as “statewide,” they are not invalidating it per
se; they are merely permitting the state legislature to preempt when and if
it sees fit.125 The spillovers from one city’s policy to others may force the
state legislature to address an issue it might have otherwise avoided.126
Similar to the “extraterritorial-impact” factor in assessing the extent
of local immunity is the criterion of the need for statewide uniformity. The
on-the-minimum-wage-increase/#48b2154252ad [https://perma.cc/JZX5-E637] (noting
that Milton Friedman was against a minimum wage, while Paul Krugman is in favor).
121. Town of Frisco v. Baum, 90 P.3d 845, 850 n.6 (Colo. 2004) (“This court
has definitively stated that zoning is generally a local and municipal matter under
[Colorado’s constitution’s home-rule provision.]”).
122. E.g., Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 155–56 (Colo. 2003).
123. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Between State and Local: A Response to
Professor Reynolds, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (2009).
124. Id. at 1307–09.
125. Id. at 1309; Reynolds, supra note 117, at 1288. Reynolds, however, notes
that the Colorado Supreme Court has on at least one occasion blended the localversus-statewide and preemption analyses. Id.
126. See Heather Gerken & James T. Dawson, Living Under Someone Else’s
Law, DEMOCRACY J., Spring 2015, at 42, 48, http://democracyjournal.org/
magazine/36/living-under-someone-elses-law/ [https://perma.cc/K2Y8-A9RT]
(“[S]pillovers force state and local officials to do what they are supposed to do:
politic, find common ground, and negotiate a compromise that no one likes but
everyone can live with.”).
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Colorado Supreme Court recently invoked this factor in its decision
invalidating local fracking bans.127 This factor as well looks at whether
state regulation would be superior to a potential local “patchwork” of
regulation.128 As applied, application of the factor often revolves around
courts’ view of the scale of the problem. If a problem or issue transcends
local boundaries, it is likely to be classified as “statewide.”129
To the extent that it can be separated from the extraterritorial-impact
factor, the need for statewide uniformity is arguably in more tension with
the logic of home rule and its power to promote innovation. One goal of
home rule is policy experimentation. If a local ordinance creates no
cognizable harm besides the mere non-uniformity of regulation, that lack
of uniformity is arguably not the kind of harm against which courts need
to guard.130 In this sense, the uniformity factor is arguably overinclusive.
On the other hand, the factor is underinclusive in that almost all issues
have importance at the state, national, and even international levels. An
issue as seemingly local as parking can have tremendous effects on more
obviously global issues like carbon emissions and climate change.131
The extraterritorial impact and uniformity factors are not arguments
for local regulation. Rather, these factors only help delimit local immunity.
In contrast, the democratic-accountability argument is a first-order
argument for local policymaking. This argument rests less on technical
competence than on the notion that local governments are more
democratically legitimate because they are “closer” to the people.132 This
justification for local self-rule has a distinguished pedigree in American
legal and political thought. Important 19th-century forebears of this
argument include Alexis de Tocqueville and Thomas Cooley.133 It is into
this rich vein that present-day proponents of local autonomy across the
127. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 572, 580 (Colo. 2016).
128. Id. at 581.
129. Id. (“[W]e conclude that the need for statewide uniformity favors the
state’s interest in regulating fracking.”).
130. See The City and the Private Right of Action, supra note 94, at 1119–23.
131. See Donald Shoup, Cruising for Parking, ACCESS, Spring 2007, at 16,
17–22 (explaining the high volume of carbon-dioxide emissions that result from
drivers “cruising” for underpriced curb parking).
132. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a
Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2000)
(reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS (1999)) (“Local governments are said to bring democracy
closer to the people . . . .”).
133. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 506–10 (1999); Amasa Eaton, The
Right to Local Self-Government, 13 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1900).
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political spectrum attempt to tap when making a renewed argument for
“constitutional” home rule. There are good reasons to be skeptical of the
democratic-accountability argument for local autonomy.134 Nonetheless,
this argument can serve as a guidepost for sketching the bounds of a
constitutional home-rule system and can explain the approach of many
states in immunizing local structural decisions from state override.
Aside from the functional, technical, and democratic arguments
regarding constitutional home rule, courts are also guided by the text of
the constitution. In a handful of states, such as California, the constitution
specifically requires immunizing certain local actions to state override.135
Administering these categories—often structural or personnel—raise the
same line-drawing issues discussed thus far. Arguably, however, in these
states the state’s constitutional text provides at least some positivist
mooring for this line-drawing exercise.
B. Modified Immunity to State Override
Some of the states that provide immunity for certain local enactments
also regulate the state’s ability to override local enactments in a less direct

134. See infra Part IV.
135. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 1(b) (“The governing body [of a county]
shall provide for the number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of
employees.”); Cty. of Riverside v. Superior Court, 66 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2003)
(holding that a state law requiring counties to enter binding arbitration with certain
employees after labor negotiations violated the state constitution); Sonoma Cty.
Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cty. of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1979) (invalidating
state law that denied local governments the use of state funds to fund cost-ofliving increases beyond those provided for in state law). California’s constitution
also protects charter cities’ authority over compensation of employees and
contractors. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (specifying municipal employee pay as a
“municipal affair”); see also State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal., AFLCIO v. City of Vista, 279 P.3d 1022, 1034 (Cal. 2012) (“conclud[ing] that no
statewide concern has been presented justifying the state’s regulation of the wages
that charter cities require their contractors to pay to workers hired to construct
locally funded public works”); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and Cty. of San Francisco,
253 F.3d 461, 474 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nder current California law, the City’s
chosen mode of contracting is a municipal affair over which the City may exercise
its authority without violating the California constitution.”). The same provision
of the California Constitution also denominates the “conduct of city elections” as
a “municipal affair.” CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5; see also Johnson v. Bradley, 841
P.2d 990, 1000 (Cal. 1992) (upholding partial public financing measure for local
candidates against state law that prohibited any candidate from accepting public
funds).
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way by requiring that preemptive laws be “general” or “uniform.” Applied
most literally, these constitutional provisions are formal or procedural,
requiring that when preemption occurs, it apply equally to all cities, or at
least all cities of a similar class. Additional states provide no absolute
immunity for any category of enactment, but still require generality or
uniformity of some or all preemptive laws. In all, approximately 16 states
demand generality or uniformity from their state legislatures to preempt
some local enactments.136
Although usually formalistic and procedural, generality provisions
can also have more substantive bite. The Ohio Supreme Court, for
instance, lays out four factors for deciding whether a state statute is a
general law. To qualify as a general law for home-rule purposes,
a statute must: 1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative
enactment; 2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate
uniformly throughout the state; 3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar
regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative
power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary or
similar regulations; and 4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens
generally.137
Applying this test, the Ohio courts have invalidated what they see as
selective or partial legislative withdrawal of local authority.138
For instance, in the seminal case articulating the standard for general
laws, City of Canton v. State, the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated a state
preemption statute that prohibited local governments from prohibiting
mobile homes in areas zoned for single-family homes.139 The court
invalidated the law in part because of its potential uneven application
across the state and because it did more to prohibit local action than
affirmatively prescribe a “rule of conduct.”140 The invalidation of the law
insulated cities’ de facto authority over zoning from preemption,141 and at
the same time may have limited the state’s ability to promote affordable
housing.142
136. See Appendix B.
137. City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 967–68 (Oh. 2002).
138. City of Cleveland v. State, No. CV-16-868008, slip op. at 4 (Ct. of
Common Pleas Jan. 30, 2017).
139. City of Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 964 (citing 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7986
(effective March 30, 1999)).
140. Id. at 969–70.
141. Id. at 968.
142. Id. at 972 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (describing the invalidated law as “an
attempt to increase the stock of affordable housing in the state”).

1074

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

In a later case, the Ohio Court of Appeals relied on City of Canton’s
general law doctrine to uphold local authority to regulate the public health.
In 2011, Cleveland passed an ordinance that prohibited restaurants from
serving foods containing artificial trans fats.143 At the behest of major fastfood companies, however, the Ohio legislature included within its biennial
appropriations bill an amendment that prohibited local governments from
enacting trans-fats restrictions, thereby preempting Cleveland’s ordinance
before it was even implemented.144 Cleveland sued, arguing that the
preemption provision violated its protected sphere of local regulation,
which entitled it to “adopt and enforce within [its] limits such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws.”145 An Ohio appellate court agreed, holding that the legislation was
not “part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative” approach to
regulating food safety and therefore did not meet the state’s judicial test
for what is a “general” law.146 Similarly, a recent trial court decision in
Ohio invalidated a state law on generality grounds that sought to preempt
Cleveland’s “Fannie Lewis Law,” which required that city contractors hire
a certain percentage of city residents and low-income persons.147
The supreme courts of New Mexico and Arizona have also relied on
the “general law” doctrine to invalidate efforts by the legislature to
regulate cities’ structures. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that a city
could decide for itself how many commissioners it would have rather than
be subject to a state law mandating five commissioners.148 In shielding the
city of Clovis from a seemingly preemptive state law, the court decided
that the state law was not “general” because it interfered with a matter of
“local” as opposed to “statewide” concern.149

143. See CLEVELAND, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 241.42 (2013).
144. See Am. Sub. H.B. 153, 129th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Oh. 2011)
(amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3717.53); see also Cleveland v. State, 989
N.E.2d 1072, 1085 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (citing an email message indicating that
the preemption provision was “a high priority for Wendy’s, McDonald’s and
YUM!”).
145. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (emphasis added).
146. Cleveland v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1072, 1087 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
147. City of Cleveland v. State, No. CV-16-868008, slip op. at 4 (Ct. of Common
Pleas Jan. 30, 2017).
148. State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 845 P.2d 150, 151 (N.M. 1992) (“We hold
that neither [state law] is a general law that expressly denies to a home rule
municipality the power to provide for a different number of city commissioners
than that fixed in those statutes.”).
149. Id. at 156 (quoting Apodaca v. Wilson, 525 P.2d 876, 882 (N.M. 1974));
see also id. at 155 (“Even if a statute applies to all municipalities throughout the
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The Arizona Supreme Court’s application of the generality doctrine is
more remarkable because there is no such textual requirement in the
constitutional home-rule provision. Nonetheless, the court held that
Tucson could preserve its unique, partisan system of electing city
councilors through ward-based primaries and at-large general elections
despite a state law that clearly sought to end this practice.150 Tucson’s
system was enshrined in its charter, but the state constitution requires
charters to be “consistent with, and subject to . . . the laws of the state.”151
Relying on a 60-year-old case, the court grafted a condition onto the
preemptive scope of state law, concluding that “laws of the state” in the
constitution refers only to “laws addressing matters of ‘statewide interest’
rather than ‘local concern.’”152 Because Tucson’s mode of electing
commissioners was of local rather than statewide interest, it was immune
to preemption by the seemingly overriding state law.153
Although the Arizona and New Mexico decisions concerned structural
matters, neither court expressly limited their holdings to that realm,
thereby holding out the possibility that another local action, perhaps
regulatory, might qualify as “local” enough to receive immunity from state
preemption through their analysis. Indeed, the Tucson majority relied
heavily on a 1951 Arizona case that explicitly embraced a division
between statewide and local matters, articulating a “laundry list” of which
matters are “statewide” and which are “local.”154
In specifically protecting structural matters from state legislative
override, Arizona, New Mexico, and the other states that take a similar
approach impliedly or explicitly endorse the democratic-accountability
argument for home rule. If local governments should be able to control
anything, the argument goes, it should be the design of their own

state, it is not necessarily a general law if it does not relate to a matter of statewide
concern.”).
150. City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624 (Ariz. 2012).
151. ARIZ. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
152. Tucson, 273 P.3d at 628 (citing Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48 (Ariz. 1951)).
153. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the validity of Tucson’s idiosyncratic
local election system under the one-person, one-vote standard of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See Pub. Integrity All., Inc. v. Tucson, 836
F.3d 1919 (2016) (en banc), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016
/09/02/15-16142.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH8Q-J8YS].
154. See Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48, 52–53 (Ariz. 1951) (citing two cases
in which a “subject” of municipal regulation was deemed “local” rather than
“statewide” in nature).
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governments.155 This assertion is questionable upon further inspection. For
instance, whether a local government uses at-large or district voting—a
quintessential choice of municipal government design—can affect the
degree of minority representation on the governing body.156 A weakmayor form of government in a major central city may lead to the kind of
executive impotence that can harm the functioning of an entire region.157
This possibility does not mean that the external effects are likely to be as
significant with these kinds of choices as with other, more substantive
matters, but rather that such effects are at least possible and must be
recognized.
Indeed, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring cities
to elect their council members from districts rather than on an at-large basis
even though it conflicted with an Omaha charter provision.158 Exploring the
statute’s legislative history, the court took note of the sponsors’—including
the legendary senator Ernie Chambers’s159—goal that district representation
would ensure more “proportionate” representation of “socioeconomic”
groups on city councils.160 While reserving the ultimate authority to decide
what is or is not a “statewide interest” sufficient to override a city charter’s
structural provision, the court held that the legislature’s decision was worthy
of deference because it was seeking “to insure the fundamental right to
155. In La Grande, Justice Linde cited the power of “the people of the locality
to decide upon the organization of their government” as the “central object” of the
amendments to the Oregon Constitution that established home rule. 576 P.2d
1204, 1208 (Or. 1978).
156. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (challenging
Mobile’s use of at-large elections for city commissioners on the basis that it
“unfairly diluted the voting strength of Negroes in violation of” the Voting Rights
Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); see also Francesco Trebbi et
al., Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities, 123 Q.J. ECON.
325 (2008) (concluding that after the Voting Rights Act, cities and towns in the
South adopted at-large voting when blacks were a smaller minority and district
voting when blacks were a larger minority—close to 50%—to reduce black
representation).
157. See, e.g., Doug Morgan et al., “Keep Portland Weird”: Retaining the
Commission Form of Government, in MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER:
CAMPAIGNS TO CHANGE THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA’S LARGE
CITIES 279 (James H. Svara & Douglas A. Watson eds. 2010) (discussing
Portland, Oregon’s “weak-mayor” form of government and criticisms thereof).
158. Jacobberger v. Terry, 320 N.W.2d 903 (Neb. 1992).
159. John Eligon, Lawmaking Maverick Resumes Course in Nebraska, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/us/ernie-chambersnebraska-senator-returns-to-capitol.html [https://perma.cc/XY7A-9MCE].
160. Jacobberger, 320 N.W.2d at 905–06.
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vote and the right to proportionate representation,” a matter that transcends
“local concern.”161
The generality and uniformity requirements thus work as a backdoor sort
of immunity for local governments. They call for a heightened level of judicial
inquiry into whether the state’s interest in preempting the local government is
legitimate. In the Cleveland trans-fat case, the fact that the preemption
withdrew local authority without replacing it with any other regulatory regime
was a fatal flaw. Perhaps the City of Canton case can be explained by the
state’s failure to enact a comprehensive regime favoring affordable housing.
As a selective withdrawal of a city’s zoning authority, the Ohio Supreme
Court was suspicious. The Nebraska case, however, stands as a cautionary
note to allowing this backdoor immunity to be absolute. There, the court was
convinced that the state had legitimate, substantive interests in interfering with
how local governments structured their councils.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE AS A REMEDY FOR THE URBAN
DISADVANTAGE IN STATE LAWMAKING
The extent of the urban disadvantage in any particular state depends
on a number of factors, including, most notably, a split in political views
between urban and rural or exurban residents.162 This split is more
pronounced in some states than others.163 Intentional, political
gerrymandering and unusually shaped districts designed to comply with
the Voting Rights Act can also compound the dynamic.164 As Chen and
Rodden demonstrate, however, political gerrymandering alone cannot
explain the legislature’s underrepresentation of urban preferences in many
states.165 Rather, even under the most politically neutral districting scheme
that complies with the usual state constitutional requirements of district
compactness and contiguousness, the uneven geographic spread of voter
preferences will result in a legislature that overstates the values of rural
and exurban voters.166
161. Id. at 907.
162. See supra Part I; Chen & Rodden, supra note 23, at 242.
163. Chen & Rodden, supra note 23, at 262 (noting that the “problem is less
severe” in Western and Southern states, where Democratic voters “are more
efficiently spread out in space”).
164. Id. at 240 (citing political science studies of these effects).
165. Id. at 266.
166. Id. (“[I]n Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, and other urbanized states
with substantial rural peripheries, [districting reform efforts] are likely to lock in
a powerful source of pro-Republican electoral bias that emanates from the distinct
voter geography of these states.”).
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Just as at the federal level, the urban disadvantage in state lawmaking
unfolds in a number of realms. Prominent examples of policies often
favored by urban-centered coalitions, but rejected or even preempted by
state legislatures include transgender and sexual orientation discrimination
protections, gun control, higher minimum wages, inclusionary zoning,
paid sick leave, paid family leave, Medicaid expansion under the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), and additional public health measures such
as menu labeling, trans-fat bans, and clean indoor-air laws.167 If cities were
simply disadvantaged at the state level, but left free to pursue their own
policies, the urban disadvantage would be problematic on normative
grounds, but less so. At least some cities would adopt their preferred
policies on their own, and the primary limitation on their effectiveness
would be due to scale and enforcement limitations. As noted earlier, states
often preempt cities’ choices in these realms entirely. Moreover, certain
choices, such as expanding Medicaid under the ACA, are for the state
alone to make.
Political scientists for years have highlighted cities’ disadvantages at
achieving their priorities in the state legislature, with earlier explanations
focusing on the pre-Reynolds malapportionment common in many
states.168 Some thorough studies of cities’ relative disadvantage focus on
cities’ abilities—or inabilities—to wrest “special” bills on their behalf
from the legislature.169 Some of these special bills would provide authority
over a particular matter to cities that otherwise lack it.170 In this sense, this
scholarship precedes, or at least analyzes data that precedes, the more
widespread availability of local authority to initiate legislation as
implemented by increased home rule across the states.171 In a notable
167. Sophie Quinton, Expect More Conflict Between Cities and States, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS: STATELINE (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/re
search-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/01/25/ expect-more-conflict-between-citiesand-states [https://perma.cc/5C5A-L662].
168. See Gerald Gamm & Thad Kousser, No Strength in Numbers: The Failure of
Big-City Bills in American State Legislatures, 1880-2000, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
663, 663, 666 (2013) (noting that “scholars . . . have contended since the nineteenth
century” that “[l]arge cities do face special burdens in state legislatures”).
169. E.g., id.
170. Id. at 664 (focusing their study on “district bills,” also “[s]ometimes
called ‘special legislation’”). Ironically, Gamm and Kousser never mention that
such bills are potentially illegal under many state constitutions. See generally
Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60
CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 719 (2012).
171. Gamm and Kousser, for instance, cite articles from 1912 and 1955,
respectively, for the proposition that states control local initiatives. Gamm &
Kousser, supra note 168, at 664–65.
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study, Gerald Gamm and Thad Kousser analyze almost 2,000 bills from
the 1880s to the present and conclude that internal fissures within large
cities’ state legislative delegations weaken such cities’ clout within the
body, as do “demographic differences between city residents and those in
the rest of the state.”172 Unlike the analysis that flows from Rodden and
Chen’s work, Gamm and Kousser and similar studies ignore cities’ lack of
success in achieving major statewide policies that disproportionately
benefit, or are preferred by, their residents, such as those discussed
above.173 Nonetheless, this other line of scholarship is instructive insofar
as cities sometimes seek special authority to pursue a policy that might
prove useful statewide or nationwide, such as New York City’s failed
pursuit of congestion pricing.174
If the composition of legislatures disadvantages urban areas because
of the distortions that result from unevenly constituted single-member
districts, governors, elected statewide, might be able to temper this
disadvantage. In theory, governors should hew closer to the median voter’s
preferences than does the median legislator, and in many states anecdotal
evidence supports this notion. Nonetheless, the base of governors’
electoral coalition and the need for governors to press other items on their
agenda in the legislature will make it advantageous for governors to sign
off on, or at least not veto, some or much of the legislation enacted by the
legislature that is disfavored in urban quarters. Hence, while governors
elected on a statewide basis should temper the urban disadvantage in the
state legislature, they are unlikely to ameliorate it completely.175
If the urban disadvantage is likely to produce legislation hostile to the
preferences of urban voters, constitutional home rule, or even some lighter
version of immunity for local enactments, offers a potential ameliorative.
At the statewide level, this argument is fairly straightforward, particularly
in those states with pronounced urban–rural splits. For instance, in Ohio,
urban residents may well be more receptive to the kind of government
regulation epitomized by Cleveland’s trans-fat ban. Hence, at time-0 the
city adopts such a policy. Although other major cities, like Cincinnati or
Columbus, may not adopt a similar policy for a variety of reasons at time0, their residents may be open to the idea and would not generally support
legislation that takes this policy choice off the table. Nonetheless, the rural172. Id. at 677.
173. Id. at 664 (noting that their study does “not include the major state health
and welfare policies that disproportionately benefit urban dwellers”).
174. See Nicholas Confessore, $8 Traffic Fee for Manhattan Fails in Albany,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, at A1.
175. See Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 342 & n.208 (discussing
governors’ roles in the legislative process).
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and exurban-dominated legislature votes to preempt any city in the state
from enacting this policy.176 If that legislative choice is viewed as fully
democratically legitimate, such statewide preemption is unproblematic. If,
on the other hand, the legislature is viewed as democratically compromised
because of the urban disadvantage, then a constitutional limit on its ability
to preempt may have normative appeal.
The argument is bolstered when considering the role of cities as
laboratories of policy innovation. Columbus and Cincinnati may well adopt
a provision like a trans-fat ban at a later time, but their governments may be
hesitant initially and wait to see how the policy goes over in Cleveland. If
the policy goes well in Cleveland, Columbus may follow suit, followed by
Cincinnati, then Akron, Dayton, and other cities. If the state can preempt the
issue before any city even attempts to address it, however, this policy
percolation can never occur.177
A. Objections to an Invigorated Imperio Home Rule
In subverting the hierarchy of states controlling local governments as
their “convenient agencies,”178 constitutional home rule strikes some
observers as “radical.”179 The idea that the policy of one city might be
completely immune to legislative override is understandably unsettling,
particularly if the policy is widely unpopular beyond the particular city
that adopts it. This possibility is probably of most concern in the fiscal or
regulatory spheres because local personnel or structural enactments may
be less likely to raise concerns outside the enacting city.180 Taken to an
extreme of very strong immunity for most local enactments, imperio home
rule might even violate the United States Constitution, which requires
states to exercise sovereignty over all their territory.181 Especially where a
176. See supra note 144.
177. Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can
Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4, 20–22 (2007)
(explaining a similar dynamic at the state level).
178. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
179. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 1342 (“As a matter of theory,
constitutional home rule represents an unusual and truly radical reconstitution of
the traditional model of state/local relations . . . .”).
180. But see supra notes 160–61(discussing an example to the contrary).
181. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“[N]o new States shall be formed or erected
within the Jurisdiction of any other State . . . without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”). The author
owes this insight to former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde. A peopleapproved initiative that creates a strong imperio system of home rule might
qualify as “the Consent of the Legislature[]” necessary under this provision, but
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city blatantly attempts to externalize problems on to other cities, such as
by banning sex offenders or waste facilities, good reason exists to be
skeptical of local immunity. The state should have the ability to allocate
statewide problems fairly throughout the state.
In many instances, however, local action merely represents a different
policy choice than that favored by the state legislative regime in power.
For instance, cities that seek to raise the minimum wage beyond the federal
and statewide floor are usually not attempting to externalize low-wage
labor on to surrounding cities. Rather, these cities merely have embraced
the notion that a higher minimum wage is better social policy, likely does
not increase unemployment, and actually helps the economy by putting
more dollars in low-wage earners’ pockets.182 The larger the city and the
more geographically isolated, the more credible this position is. Big-city
residents cannot scurry off to the suburbs for every takeout meal,
pharmacy purchase, and other kinds of transactions in which low-wage
employees are most typically involved. Although wage ordinances might
have the effect of keeping some big-box stores out of the city, city officials
may reject the big-box model of retail provision and prefer an economic
system in which this model is less viable.183 Similarly, with respect to other
urban priorities—inclusionary zoning, paid sick leave, transgender rights,
gun control, and even immigration regulation—the costs and benefits of
these policies are not easy to determine, even after put into effect. Other
policies, such as congestion pricing, might be seen as attempts to
externalize costs onto outsiders, but even these policies may serve
statewide or national goals and may impose costs on city residents as
well.184
Congressional approval would also be necessary. Cf. Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz.
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 2562 (2015) (holding that a voterapproved initiative qualifies as action of a state “Legislature” for purposes of
Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution).
182. See, e.g., MINIMUM WAGE WORKING GRP., CITY OF CHICAGO, A FAIR DEAL
FOR CHICAGO’S WORKING FAMILIES: A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE THE MINIMUM
WAGE 3 (2014), http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/general
/MinimumWageReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/X75S-UBVA] (proposing an increase
in minimum wage citywide to $13 an hour).
183. Patricia M. Salkin, Municipal Regulation of Formula Businesses:
Creating and Protecting Communities, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1251, 1253–61
(2008) (discussing reasons why communities have attempted to exclude or coerce
businesses like Wal-Mart by requiring big-box retailers to pay “living wages”).
184. See Confessore, supra note 174 (noting that “civic, labor, and
environmental organizations” considered congestion pricing, which would have
applied to any driver entering Manhattan south of 60th Street during peak hours,
as “a bold and essential step to help manage the city’s inexorable growth” while
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One concern about the imperio approach to regulatory home rule is
that it creates uncertainty regarding which local actions are immune to
override and which are not.185 As with any decisional system that defies
easy and objective prediction, the possibility exists that court decisions in
this area will be seen as “result based” and political.186 A pure legislative
system of home rule, by contrast, allows for state preemption of any and all
matters.187 In those states where immunity is provided only to structural or
personnel matters, ambiguity still remains regarding whether a particular local
ordinance or policy falls within such parameters.188
A related objection to imperio home rule is that some states have
historically used it to limit the initiative authority of local governments to the
“local” realm.189 Using this approach, although “local” enactments were
immune from override, cities were prohibited from addressing “statewide”
matters even in the absence of preemption. Today, most states that retain some
version of imperio home rule allow localities to regulate all matters unless
politicians from the outer boroughs and suburbs viewed the proposal “as a
regressive measure that overwhelmingly benefited affluent Manhattanites”).
185. See Kenneth Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since
the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 & n.5 (1975) (discussing
dissatisfaction with the “uncertainty” of imperio home rule).
186. E.g., City of La Grande v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1213 (Or.
1978) (defining the “subject” of a law and “assign[ing] it to one or the other level
of government” “merely marks the desired conclusion of an argument rather than
its premise”). Dean Sandalow noted the widespread critique of judicial
implementation of imperio home rule in his comprehensive review of the subject
more than a half-century ago. See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal
Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 661
(1964) (noting that “acclaim” has not been the “reward” of the judiciary for its
efforts to distinguish between “what ‘affairs’ are ‘municipal’ . . . and ‘local’”).
Baker and Rodriguez, on the other hand, are much more sanguine about the
judiciary’s ability to perform this task. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at
1370–71 (“Judicial norms can be expected to cause the courts to strive for
continuity over time in deciding what is or is not a matter of local concern.”); see
also Vanlandingham, supra note 185, at 27 (“Although delineation of home rule
powers under imperio provisions admittedly is difficult, it is not an impossible
task . . . .”).
187. E.g., City of La Grande, 576 P.2d at 1213–14 (“A search for a
predominant state or local interest in the ‘subject matter’ of legislation can only
substitute for the political process . . . the court’s own political judgment whether
the state or the local policy should prevail.”).
188. E.g., id. at 1230 (Tongue, J., dissenting) (arguing that the policy at issue
should qualify as “structural” under the majority’s newly minted test).
189. See Intrastate Preemption, supra note 56, at 1124–25 (discussing early
home-rule regimes).
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and until the state acts to preempt. In Colorado, the court purports to limit
local government authority over “statewide” matters to those for which a
state constitutional provision or statute specifically provides authority, but
in practice classifies most regulatory matters as “mixed” statewide and
local concerns, in which cities are empowered to act.190 Although the use
of “local” as a limitation rather than merely a shield remains in some
states, no reason exists as to why imperio home rule needs to be applied
this way. Rather, to the extent that this Article endorses constitutional
home rule, it does so from the premise that any such system leaves all
policy options on the table at least until the legislature or people speak on
the matter in some way.
1. An Imperfect Fit with Respect to Issues
As currently structured, constitutional home rule is not a good fit for
remedying the urban disadvantage. Most states that provide some
immunity for local enactments do so only for personnel or structural
matters.191 It is in the regulatory and fiscal spheres, however, that
immunizing big-city local enactments would offer the most potential to
remedy the urban disadvantage. Imperio home rule in the fiscal realm is an
awkward fit because most local governments are highly constrained with
respect to their initiative authority to raise revenue, which means the
immunity question never arises.192
In those few states that apply the local–statewide distinction to regulatory
matters, many of the more important local policies may well fall on the
statewide side of the divide and therefore remain vulnerable to preemption by
the state legislature. For instance, if North Carolina had constitutional home
rule for “local” regulatory matters, which it does not, Charlotte’s ordinance
providing protection in employment and public accommodations on the
basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, and other categories might
have been considered regulation of a statewide or mixed local–statewide
matter regardless. Therefore, the state legislature would still have been
free to preempt the ordinance, at least as applied to private actors.
Nonetheless, more states provide some type of immunity to local
structural or personnel decisions. Many of the prominent regulatory
measures cities have adopted also apply internally, thus making them
190. E.g., Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d 30, 37–
39 (holding that rent control is a matter of mixed state and local concern).
191. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
192. See Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing
Authority and What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 312 (2016) (noting
that “[l]imits on city revenue authority hamper policymaking”).

1084

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

structural or personnel ordinances as well. The preempted Charlotte
ordinance, for instance, regulates the city’s operations, such as requiring
contractors not to discriminate on the basis of gender identity, sexual
orientation, and so forth.193 Many cities have used this more limited scope
of regulation in part to evade other potential doctrinal proscriptions on
local power, such as the “private law exception.”194 Hence, cities took the
first steps toward recognizing the sanctity of gay unions by applying samesex benefits to their own employees and requiring that city contractors do
the same.195 Constitutional home rule for structural and personnel
decisions, therefore, may not apply as sweepingly, but can still have an
effect.
Moreover, certain “structural” matters are substantive in their own
way. There is a good chance that local campaign finance regulation, for
instance, would be considered structural and immune—or more
immune—to preemption in several states.196 This issue is of much concern
to advocates throughout the country, and it is one that cities may be better
positioned to address where the constitution has been read to provide some
protection against state override.197
Another structural or personnel issue in which immunity to state
override might be justified to remediate the urban disadvantage in the state
legislature is that of municipal-employee-residency requirements. In the
last decade, at least two states—Ohio and Wisconsin—have rescinded the
authority of cities to require employees to live within city boundaries. 198
193. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056, (Feb. 22, 2016), http://charmeck.org
/city/charlotte/nondiscrimination/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/2538-DA
AY].
194. See Darin M. Dalmat, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: The
Legal Viability of Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home Rule, 39 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 93, 118–26 (2005).
195. See Equal Benefits Ordinances, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org
/resources/equal-benefits-ordinances [https://perma.cc/ 7DZX-SG8F] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2017).
196. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, The Brief History of “Voter-Owned Elections”
in Portland, Oregon: If Public Financing Can’t Make it There, Can it Make it
Anywhere?, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 637, 644 (noting that under Oregon’s
constitution, Portland’s public financing program for city candidates likely
enjoyed strong immunity from state override).
197. In North Carolina, by contrast, where there is no such constitutional
protection, the legislature rescinded its authorization for public financing in
Chapel Hill in 2013. Id. at 652 n.90.
198. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.481 (West 2017) (enacted 2006) (prohibiting
any political subdivision from requiring its employees to reside in any specific
area of the state); WIS. STAT. ANN § 66.0502 (West 2017) (enacted 2013)
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These laws were passed despite stiff opposition by cities. Although some
deride the ordinances as protectionist, in the wake of police tensions in
Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere, these ordinances could serve as
models for making a police force more representative of the community.199
Nonetheless, the suburban- and rural-dominated legislatures in these states
preempted the local policies, and the cities lost their court cases asserting
immunity, although not without strong dissents.200
There are likely substantive regulatory fields in which constitutional
home rule may be undesirable, even as applied to densely populated cities
that suffer from underrepresentation in the legislature. For instance, many
cities, including large and densely populated cities, engage in zoning that
might be called exclusionary.201 If a state supreme court considers zoning
to be a “local issue” that the state legislature may not breach, such an
approach could immunize exclusionary zoning to statewide control.
Although few state legislatures have affirmatively attempted to tackle
exclusionary zoning, a constitutional home-rule system that prohibits such
an attempt would be problematic from the perspective of promoting
affordable housing. In Oregon, for instance, immunity for local zoning
would prevent the state’s legendary statewide land-use system from
requiring localities to offer a mix of housing for different income and
demographic groups.202 On the other hand, when a city seeks to take on

(prohibiting cities, towns, villages, counties, and school districts from requiring
their employees to live within their jurisdictional limits).
199. Nate Silver, Most Police Don’t Live in the Cities They Serve,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 20, 2014, 4:14 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab
/most-police-dont-live-in-the-cities-they-serve/ [https://perma.cc/LR4G-YVNU].
200. Black v. City of Milwaukee, 882 N.W.2d 333, 364 (Wis. 2016) (Bradley,
J., dissenting); Lima v. State, 909 N.E.2d 616, 626 (Ohio 2009) (Lanzinger, J.,
dissenting).
201. Edward Glaeser has done the most thorough work on this topic, offering
evidence that New York, San Francisco, Boston, and other major cities and their
surrounding metropolitan areas severely limit housing supply through zoning
regulation. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Is Manhattan So Expensive?
Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 366–67 (2005)
(concluding that “one-half or more” of condominium value in Manhattan is
attributable to “regulatory constraint[s] preventing the construction of new
housing”).
202. See OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV., OREGON’S
STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS & GUIDELINES (2010) (discussing Or. Admin. R.
660-015-000(10)) (requiring local jurisdictions to plan for housing “that meets the
housing needs of households of all income levels”); see generally Edward J.
Sullivan, The Quiet Revolution Goes West: The Oregon Planning Program 1961-
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more than its fair share of a regional problem like affordable housing, such
as by adopting an inclusionary zoning ordinance, constitutional home rule
would seem more appropriate to prevent or limit state preemption.203
2. Threshold for Immunity
Assuming, however, that constitutional home rule is at least a
somewhat useful method of democratic remediation, the question of which
cities and counties should benefit arises. Under the normative framework
of one-person, one-vote, and partisan fairness, the most disadvantaged
cities in most states are the most populous and the most densely populated.
This situation is not the case in every state, but it is in the many states in
which the densely populated, urban areas have political preferences starkly
different from exurban and rural areas in the rest of the state.204 In states
like New Jersey, Maryland, or Massachusetts, where the entire population
is fairly urbanized, there is a weaker claim to any increased urban power,
just as the claim is weaker in states where rural and exurban voters share
similar political views, at least on many issues, with those living in densely
populated cities, such as Colorado, Vermont, and, to a lesser extent,
Oregon.205
The Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) likely increases the number of states
in which a stark urban disadvantage exists.206 In certain Southern states
2011, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 357 (2012) (reviewing the history of Oregon’s
unique statewide land-use planning system).
203. Cf. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d 30, 44
(Colo. 2000) (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that town’s inclusionary
zoning ordinance is “local” matter that does not conflict with state statute banning
rent control).
204. See Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 45 (listing Indiana, Michigan,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin, in addition to
Florida); Chen & Rodden, supra note 23, at 240, 241 (discussing Florida,
Michigan, Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, and Pennsylvania).
205. Chen & Rodden, supra note 23, at 264 (“[I]n a state like New Jersey,
Democrats are evenly dispersed throughout an urban corridor that lacks a
sprawling and heterogeneous rural periphery, thus avoiding the phenomenon [of
unintentional gerrymandering]”). In a state like Oregon, the urban disadvantage
may be reduced with respect to certain policies, such as higher minimum wage or
paid sick leave, but not with respect to others where there is a defined rural–urban
split that transcends partisanship, such as gun control.
206. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012) (providing that a violation of the right to
vote may be proven by “show[ing] that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a [protected] class of citizens . . . in that its members
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with large numbers of black voters in rural areas, like South Carolina,
Mississippi, and Alabama, the VRA packs African-American voters into
majority–minority districts. Without the VRA, these voters—who usually
share the political preferences, at least on many issues, held by urban
voters—might be spread out enough so as to counter the urban
disadvantage common in the more urbanized northern states.207
It is not just residents of large cities who are disadvantaged in many
states, but others who reside in large metropolitan areas, even in smaller
suburbs or unincorporated pockets. Smaller cities with intense left-leaning
preferences—for example, Ann Arbor and Boulder—feel the effect of the
urban disadvantage in many state systems insofar as the legislature leans
away from their voters’ preferences as well.208 Other small cities, by
contrast, may hew closer to the median legislator’s preference than do the
college towns—for example, Grand Rapids and Colorado Springs. To be
seen as legitimate, any system of constitutional home rule would
undoubtedly need a neutral threshold rather than one based on political
demographics—for example, party registration—even if the latter might
more accurately combat the problem identified herein.
Many states already use population thresholds for home rule
protections, so the notion of a population “cutoff” has a firm pedigree.
Illinois, for instance, requires that cities have a population of at least
25,000 to qualify as a “home-rule unit.”209 Although these thresholds are
generally lower than what might be adopted for the specific purpose of
remedying an urban disadvantage in the state legislature, they provide a
solid precedent for distinguishing among cities by population in terms of
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice”); Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986) (interpreting this provision in the context of
multimember districts).
207. See Keisuke Nakao, Racial Redistricting for Minority Representation
without Partisan Bias: A Theoretical Approach, 23 ECON. & POL. 132 (2011);
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283,
351–52 (2014) (“[T]he VRA may result in misalignment by inefficiently
‘packing’ Democrats into majority-minority districts.”); but see id. at 352 (noting
that it is not inevitable that VRA results in inefficient packing) (citing Adam B.
Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 573 (2011)).
208. Chen & Rodden, supra note 23, at 244 (noting support for Democratic
candidates in big cities in Florida as well as in “a few other smaller railroad and
college towns”).
209. ILL. CONST. art VII, § 6(a). See also COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (minimum
population of 2,000 to adopt municipal home rule charter); WASH. CONST. art. XI,
§ 12 (requiring population of 10,000 for city to frame charter).
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their powers.210 States might amend their constitutions to raise the
threshold for immunity power. Only those cities with populations greater
than 100,000 or 200,000, for instance, might qualify.
Even if states retain relatively low population thresholds for home rule
to apply, many states also require that population-eligible cities
affirmatively opt in to home rule.211 Not all eligible cities do so because
opting in to home rule often comes with rights and responsibility. For
instance, in some states, opting into home rule offers a city or county
greater structural, fiscal, or regulatory authority but also requires that the
city reorganize itself in a way different from the default statutory
regime.212 Opting into home rule can also permit a city greater fiscal
authority, such as the ability to raise taxes beyond a default level set by the
state.213 It is likely that only those cities whose populations prefer a more
activist government would avail themselves of this opportunity, thus
“tailoring” home rule in a way that may help remedy the urban
disadvantage in some states.214
210. George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the
Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 20 STETSON L. REV. 5, 40 n.196
(1990) (“A minimum population condition to the exercise of home rule is not
uncommon, in both earlier [home rule] provisions . . . and in more current
provisions.”) (citing various state constitutions).
211. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (“Any city containing, now or hereafter,
a population of more than three thousand five hundred may frame a charter for its
own government . . . .”) (emphasis added); WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10 (“Any city
containing a population of ten thousand inhabitants, or more, shall be permitted
to frame a charter for its own government . . . .”).
212. See WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 12 (requiring population of 10,000 for city
to frame charter); OR. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (prescribing the method for counties
to adopt home rule, which requires adoption of a county charter delineating the
county’s governance structure).
213. See Home Rule and You, EDUC. BROCHURE (Citizen Advocacy Ctr.,
Elmhurst, Ill.), Summer 2004, http://www.citizenadvocacycenter.org/uploads/8/8/4/0
/8840743/homerulebrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFX2-NWML] (“Home rule [in
Illinois] . . . is most commonly used to generate revenue through its broad taxation
powers.”).
214. In Illinois, for instance, cities may opt out of home rule. Residents of
Rockford, Illinois, for instance, voted to abandon home rule in 1983 out of
frustration with higher tax rates that resulted from fiscal home rule, but some now
argue that this choice was a mistake because of the regulatory power lost. Our
View: Home Rule a Tool Worth Bringing Back to Rockford, ROCKFORD REG.
STAR (June 21, 2013, 8:02 PM), http://www.rrstar.com/x1629902134/Our-ViewHome-rule-a-tool-worth-bringing-back-in-Rockford [https://perma.cc/NR9M-PS
8T]; James M. Banovetz, Illinois Home Rule: A Case Study in Fiscal
Responsibility, 32 J. REG. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 79, 95 (2002).
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Even if population thresholds for home rule are lower than ideal for
remedying an urban disadvantage and are offered by default when a city
reaches the threshold, it is likely that the cities that most actively use their
home-rule authority will be the larger ones. These cities are more likely to
have the full-time, professional city councils and sophisticated administrative
agencies that play a crucial role in proposing and implementing major policy
reform.215 Large cities are also more immune to capital or population flight
because of the adoption of a particular regulation.216 Hence, constitutional
home rule might protect Charlotte and its adoption of a gay and transgender
rights ordinance from override even if it also protects Wilmington, WinstonSalem, and Kannapolis, none of which have adopted such an ordinance.
Moving beyond cities, providing constitutional home rule to counties
may be crucial to remedying the urban disadvantage in those states where
counties, rather than or in addition to cities, play an active role in
policymaking. With a sufficiently high threshold, county home rule would
include those densely populated areas near major cities that are similarly
underrepresented in the state legislature but may not be incorporated into
their own municipality. In some large metropolitan areas, the merged city–
county government offers an especially helpful structure for local
empowerment.217
In theory, a state’s home-rule system might instead draw distinctions
between those cities or counties that receive constitutional protection for
their enactments and those that do not on the basis of population density.
Density likely would be a better metric for remediating the urban
disadvantage than the cruder total population figure. There is arguably
some precedent for this approach in that density is often a factor in the
legal test for whether an area may incorporate under state law.218 Such
thresholds are fairly low, however. In some states, an incorporated city—
no matter how small—automatically ascends to all the rights of every other
city in the state.219 In other states, incorporation creates a municipality of
215. See Why Innovate?, supra note 8, at 1250 & n.80.
216. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1507 (2010) (reviewing agglomeration economies).
217. For a recent proposal in this regard, see E. Terrence Jones, Toward
Regionalism: The St. Louis Approach, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 103 (2014).
See also Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39
URB. LAW. 483, 499 (2007) (discussing city–county mergers in Nashville,
Indianapolis, and Miami as “rare success[es]”).
218. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0205 (West 2017) (establishing population
density minimums for incorporating in different municipal forms).
219. Oregon, for instance, draws no legal distinctions among incorporated
cities in terms of their authority.
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some form, but becoming a “home-rule” city requires another step or a
minimum population.220 No state currently uses density as the next step for
home-rule eligibility, but there is precedent for the concept.
Without an appropriate threshold, constitutional home rule might
compound the urban disadvantage in some ways. In recent years, slowmoving renaissance has been in favor of local immunity to statewide
enactment. This movement has attracted interest across the political
spectrum, usually in smaller communities. The issues that have spurred
interest in this notion have been environmental protection and food
regulation, as well as gun control. For instance, in Oregon, some small
counties have sought to enshrine immunity for local enactments into the
state constitution to ensure that the state does not site a liquefied-naturalgas terminal in their backyard, to protect the prerogative of a county to ban
genetically modified organisms, and to prevent stricter statewide
background checks for firearms purchases from taking effect.221 In Maine,
proponents of raw milk in rural areas have sought to nullify state laws that
require pasteurization.222
In making their case for local immunity, these proponents often
ground their arguments in the Tocqueville and Cooley strains of American
legal thought.223 These proponents care not about the size of the local
220. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
221. See Local Law Center, COMMUNITY ENVTL. LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
http://celdf.org/law-library/local-law-center/ [https://perma.cc/4NJ4-6P3T] (last
visited Feb. 15, 2017) (citing proposed Coos County ordinance to prevent
construction of Jordan Cove Export Terminal “and the accompanying LNG
pipeline”); Mateusz Perkowski, Local GMO Control Initiative Faces Setback,
CAPITAL PRESS (July 15, 2015, 12:48 PM), http://www.capitalpress.com/Oregon
/20150715/local-gmo-control-initiative-faces-setback [https://perma.cc/D98R-J2XQ]
(discussing “a proposed ballot initiative” in Oregon “to overturn statewide preemption [sic] laws” regarding GMO’s); Coos County, Or., Second Amendment
Preservation Ordinance (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.co.coos.or.us/Portals/0/County%
20Clerk/Elections/ Election%202015/November%20Election/secondamendmentpre
servationordinance.pdf?ver=2015-10-20-111618-217 [https://perma.cc/3JBP-DZE
M].
222. Julia Bayly, Maine Towns Declare Food Sovereignty, Claim “Home Rule”
Trumps State, Federal Regulations, BANGOR DAILY NEWS: HOMESTEAD (Mar. 7,
2016, 6:36 AM), http://bangordailynews.com/2016/03/07/homestead/maine-townsdeclare-food-sovereignty-claim-home-rule-trumps-state-federal-regulations/ [https:
//perma.cc/EA33-FQCW] (discussing the efforts of “16 Maine towns in seven
counties [that] have declared food sovereignty with local ordinances giving residents
the right to produce, sell, purchase and consume local foods of their own choosing”
and its connection to the raw-milk movement).
223. See supra note 133.
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government unit. Rather, they stress the notion that the American legal
system should or does provide a “natural” or “fundamental” right to local
government.224 Attorney and activist Thomas Linzey, for instance, has
urged communities both small and large to use their “sovereign” local
government powers to resist environmental impositions from the state, like
mandates to permit hydraulic fracturing or liquefied natural gas facilities.225
On gun “rights,” several smaller, rural jurisdictions have enacted ordinances
or charter amendments that seek to nullify state and federal restrictions on
firearms transfer.226 In doing so, some have expressly cited Cooley’s famous
opinion in People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, declaring that local government
is a “matter of absolute right” that “the state cannot . . . take away.”227 These
recent efforts to “reclaim” local sovereignty are not entirely new, of course.
In the 1990s, for instance, several Western rural counties sought
unsuccessfully to resist federal regulation of public lands by invoking this
rhetoric, although much of their argument focused on local governments or
states combating the federal government rather than the state.228
Despite its distinguished intellectual and historical pedigree, the right to
local government as a fundamental or natural right has always been a
minority position in American jurisprudence. Should this “right” bestow
immunity on all local enactments regardless of city size, as some activists
argue, the beneficiaries of this immunity would often be the rural and
exurban communities whose views already receive more than adequate
representation in state legislatures. This result is especially true where the
immunized local action would impose potential externalities on surrounding
communities. For instance, when a community seeks to exempt itself from
milk-pasteurization laws, it threatens the health of the wider populace who
might purchase such milk and also threatens to impose the burden of
medical costs on society at large. Similarly, when a rural county seeks to
exempt itself from state gun control requirements, it allows firearms to be
224. Amasa Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government, 13 HARV. L. REV. 441
(1900).
225. Chelsea Davis, Coos County Community Rights Group Driven to “Legalize
Sustainability,” THE WORLD (Oct. 10, 2015), http://theworldlink.com/lng/cooscounty-community-rights-group-driven-to-legalize-sustainability/article_fad88e82-0
1c0-5175-857b-4d675fdcf1c2.html [https://perma.cc/GY2C-DWMZ]; see also
Perkowski, supra note 221.
226. E.g., Coos County, Or., Second Amendment Preservation Ordinance (Nov.
3, 2015).
227. Id. (citing People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 108 (1871)).
228. Alexander H. Southwell, Comment, The County Supremacy Movement:
The Federalism Implications of a 1990s States’ Rights Battle, 32 GONZ. L. REV.
417 (1996).
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purchased there that can then be used to commit violence in other parts of
the state and nation.
The concern regarding externalities applies to big-city enactments as
well. Some might think that a higher minimum wage in one of the state’s
largest cities will hurt the economy of the state overall. Much political
debate at all levels of government is about which policies work and which
tradeoffs are acceptable. The premise of this Article is that urban areas are
at an unfair disadvantage in making their cases at the federal and state
legislative levels. Hence, local government can counter this disadvantage
for large cities and can more effectively do so when enactments have a
stronger immunity to preemption. Local enactments by smaller jurisdictions
need no such immunity for this purpose. Neither government likely deserves
immunity for clear, demonstrable externalities.229
There may be other normative reasons for privileging any local
enactment over those of the state government. Well-funded interest groups
may exercise disproportionately more power at the state and federal levels
than at local levels.230 Democratic accountability of local governments may
be stronger because of their proximity and lower official–constituent
ratios.231 These groups are likely part of the reason that many
communities—large and small—feel disillusioned with higher levels of
government. Opponents of genetically modified organisms, for instance,
have achieved some notable success in low-population areas.232 Such

229. See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
230. See Why Innovate?, supra note 8, at 1258–61.
231. Id. at 1256–68.
232. See KAUAI COUNTY, HAW., KAUAI COUNTY CODE §§ 22–23.7 (2014)
(strictly regulating the use of GMOs), invalidated by Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v.
County of Kauai, Civ. No. 14-00014, 2014 WL 4216022 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014)
(holding Kauai’s ordinance preempted). In Oregon, voters in two smaller, rural
counties—Jackson and Josephine—passed ordinances banning most GMOs in 2014.
See Josephine County, Or. Genetically Engineered Plant Ordinance (May 20, 2014),
h t tp : / /o r e go n i a n s f o r sa fe far ms a n d fa mi l i e s.o r g / m ea s u r e1 7 - 5 8 . h t ml
[https://perma.cc/APM7-MABQ]; JACKSON COUNTY, OR., ORDINANCES ch. 635
(2012). In 2013, the Oregon state legislature prohibited local governments from
enacting GMO bans, but exempted any then-pending measure, which included the
initiative that ultimately passed in Jackson County. See Certainty for Family Farmers
of Oregon Act, 2013 Or. Laws Spec. Sess. 2507 (effective Oct. 8, 2013). A trial court
has since held that Josephine County’s ordinance is preempted by state law, see Letter
Opinion, White v. Josephine County, No. 15CV23592 (Or. Cir. Ct. Josephine County
May 16, 2016) (on file with author), while a federal lawsuit challenging Jackson
County’s ordinance under the state’s “right to farm” statute was settled. See Lawsuit
Over GMO Ban in Jackson County Settled, THE OREGONIAN: OREGONLIVE (Dec. 7,
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success reflects not just the ideological leanings of these areas, but also the
greater comparative ability of grassroots organizations to succeed at the
local level in achieving legislation they prefer. These reasons may be good
to prefer any local action over state or federal action, but they are not
concerns related to one-person, one-vote and partisan and ideological
alignment, which are the driving concerns of this series.
B. Potential Limitations on Constitutional Home Rule
To assuage concerns regarding where and how to set the threshold for
immunity to preemption, several factors come into play. First, if a state
has direct democracy to enact statutes, such a system complies fully with
one-person, one-vote. In addition, the lack of any district-based voting
means that urban areas are not disadvantaged in any way. Hence, a system
of home rule whereby constitutional limits on the state legislature’s power
to preempt do not necessarily apply to the plebiscite might be preferred,
because the plebiscite does not create or reinforce the kind of urban
disadvantage with which this project is concerned.233 For similar reasons,
a system whereby state preemptive legislation can take effect only when
ratified by a majority statewide might be preferred. There are, of course,
legions of problems with direct democracy, as judges and commentators
have noted, but imposing a specific disadvantage on urban views is not
one of them.234
Second, the constitutional home rule remedy need not be wholly
undertaken to embrace some of its urban remediation benefits. If an
absolute shield against statewide preemption is too extreme or may sweep
into its protection more jurisdictions than preferred, a softer version of
immunity like that used by the Ohio Court of Appeals in Cleveland v. State
might be preferable.235 Using such an approach, the courts demand a
general statewide interest that the state legislature seeks to enforce by
preempting the local ordinance. There is not a hard-and-fast bar to
preemption, but the state is at least forced to demonstrate that its choice to
preempt reflects more than simply the influence of a well-connected
2015, 12:06 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/12/law
suit_over_gmo_ban_in_jackso.html [https://perma.cc/B8CS -MQBW].
233. Cf. Note, Power of the Legislature to Amend or Repeal Direct
Legislation, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 439 (1942) (asking whether state legislature should
be able to overrule laws passed by initiative).
234. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring
Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1141, 1144–49 (2003) (reviewing common criticisms of direct democracy).
235. 989 N.E.2d 1072, 1085 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
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interest group.236 The state is forced to articulate how the preemptive
choice furthers a general interest of the public, and it would be required to
apply that preemption to all local governments of similar form and stature
equally. In this sense, preemption analysis overlaps with the state courts’
enforcement of state constitutional bans on special legislation.237
C. Other Wrinkles: Chronology and Judicial Enforcement
Another wrinkle in the notion of using constitutional home rule or
similar provisions to remedy the urban disadvantage in state lawmaking is
chronological. First, insofar as the urban disadvantage is a function of state
legislative district drawing, these districts will vary over time, and the
disadvantage can be compounded, reduced, or—in some states—even
eliminated by partisan gerrymandering.238 Because states redistrict every
ten years, however, it is possible that an urban disadvantage at time-0 may
no longer be in effect at time-1; legislation from time-0 that constrains
local power, however, may remain on the books. Moreover, several states
have delegated district drawing to nonpartisan commissions that purport
to have eliminated such gerrymandering; nonetheless, legislation may
remain from before these commissions came into being. 239 The power of
236. Id. (quoting a restaurant lobbying group’s email in support of the
preemption calling it “a high priority for Wendy’s, McDonald’s and Yum! [the
owner of KFC, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut]” and concluding that “the amendments
were drafted on behalf of a special interest group with the specific purpose of
snuffing out the Ordinance”).
237. See Long, supra note 170.
238. In some states, a politically motivated, pro-Democratic gerrymander
might succeed in evening the playing field for urban voters. In other states, even
such a gerrymander will not level the field given the current entrenched
Republican advantage under single-member, winner-take-all districts. See Chen
& Rodden, supra note 23, at 263 (“[I]n a state like Georgia, where the [districting]
simulations reveal an especially bad geography for Democrats, even an aggressive
pro-Democratic gerrymander was unable to completely erase the built-in proRepublican bias.”).
239. See Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Ind. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2662
nn.9–6 (2015) (citing commissions in Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey,
Washington, California, Iowa, Ohio, Maine, Connecticut, and Indiana); Leading
Cases, Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,
129 HARV. L. REV. 191, 196–97 (2015) (“With independent commissions now
bearing the Court’s seal of constitutional approval, redistricting-reform activists may
seek their implementation in additional states—especially those in which the people
are delegated legislative authority by their state constitutions.”); Peter Miller &
Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western United States, 3 U. C.
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inertia in the legislative process is strong.240 Although the more urbanfriendly legislature at time-1 might never enact the preemptive legislation
that was enacted at time-0, it may be much more difficult for it to gather
the votes to reverse the earlier legislation.
A possible example of this dynamic recently occurred in Oregon. In
1999, the Oregon Legislature banned inclusionary zoning. The
Republican-led state legislature was arguably tilted against urban interests
in a way that recent legislatures no longer are.241 Nonetheless, the 1999
Oregon Legislature enacted a ban on inclusionary zoning that persisted for
many years despite numerous local governments’ strenuous objections to
it.242 Finally, in 2016, the legislature modestly reversed the ban, but not
without giving many concessions to landlords and developers along the
way.243 Prior laws are problematic, particularly when strongly supported
by powerful interest groups like the homebuilders’ lobby, and much votewrangling took place for the legislature to eke out a reversal of the ban in
2016. An urban disadvantage may disappear or significantly reduce
because of systematic changes in state government or changes in political
demography, but the effects of the prior disadvantage may persist.
Therefore, one might want constitutional home rule to protect retroactively
against laws passed when the disadvantage applied in full force.
IRVINE L. REV. 637, 642 (2013) (noting that states with direct democracy have
been at the forefront of districting reform); see also League of Women Voters of
Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015) (invalidating districting plan on the
basis of the Fair Districts Amendment to the Florida constitution, FLA. CONST.
art. III, § 20(a), which was enacted by the voters in 2010 and prohibits redistricting
“with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent”).
240. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 251
(1994).
241. See 1999-2000 OREGON BLUEBOOK (1999).
242. 1999 Or. Laws 2040, § 2 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.309
(West 2017)); see also Dennis C. Theriault, Housing Crisis: Inclusionary Zoning
Bill Clears Senate, Bucking Years of Failure, THE OREGONIAN: OREGONLIVE
(Feb. 26, 2016, 12:13 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf
/2016/02/housing_crisis_inclusionary_zo.html [https://perma.cc/U2QF-28EU].
243. See S.B. 1533, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016). These
concessions included strict limitations on cities’ authority to require affordable
housing as a condition of granting development permits, see id., as well as two
other bills that provided favors to the homebuilding lobby. See H.B. 4079, 78th
Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016) (allowing “pilot” expansion of Urban
Growth Boundary for affordable housing); S.B. 1573, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2016) (allowing city councils to approve annexation without voter
approval); see also Theriault, supra note 242 (noting that the inclusionary zoning
bill was “a key piece in a four-bill grand bargain on housing matters”).
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Even if the state constitution can be fairly read to require some sort of
local immunity, the question remains as to what makes state judges any
better than state legislatures at enforcing urban preferences. In other
words, when judges are viewed as political rather than purely legal actors,
whether they are any better positioned to protect urban populations than
the state legislature is questionable. In most states, the answer would
appear to be that judges are better positioned because of the fact that judges
are elected statewide.244 As a result, insofar as their views reflect the
voters’ views at all, the median state high court judge should be much
closer to the median voter than is the median legislator in most state
legislatures. Judicial elections are notoriously low-information affairs,
however. It is impossible to gauge whether decisions on home-rule matters
influence judicial election results at all. Nonetheless, nothing in the design
of most states’ judicial elections could be expected to institutionally tilt
judges’ views away from the preferences of urban dwellers.
IV. CAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEAR THE BURDEN
OF THE PRIVILEGE OF IMMUNITY?
In considering the idea of elevating certain local enactments beyond
state legislative preemption, examining the functioning of local
democracy itself to ask whether it merits this privilege is only reasonable.
Numerous critiques have been levied at the quality of local democracy,
including that it is often subject to corruption, voter apathy and ignorance,
and that it is particularly susceptible to capture by certain interest
groups.245 An additional critique—that local governments enact few
policies of statewide or national importance—can be dispensed with
easily.246 If local governments were not enacting important policies of
244. Of the 37 states that elect their highest court’s judges, only eight use
geographical districts. See Intrastate Preemption, supra note 56, at 1162 & n.236
(noting district judicial elections in Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota). None of these states is
among those in which the urban disadvantage is most prominent. Moreover,
among these eight states, in four the initial selection of justices is made by the
governor, a statewide elected official. Id. at 1162 n.238 (listing Maryland,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota as such users of retention elections).
245. See, e.g., CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION & LOCAL
DEMOCRACY 15–30 (2011).
246. E.g., KAREN M. KAUFMANN, THE URBAN VOTER: GROUP CONFLICT &
MAYORAL VOTING BEHAVIOR IN AMERICAN CITIES 18–19 (2004) (“Local
governments . . . are primarily service providers [whose] decisions are less policy
driven . . . .”).
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concern to higher-level authorities, clashes between states and cities
should be rare. Because city and state policy preferences are frequently in
conflict, however, it appears that many cities, particularly the largest ones,
are enacting policies beyond the provision of “bread-and-butter” services
like parks and trash pickup.
Even in big cities where councils and mayors may have ambitious
agendas, however, voter awareness of and turnout for local elections often
lag behind that for higher-level offices.247 Certainly, as compared to
federal elections, local-only elections, especially for city council, draw a
weak turnout.248 As compared to state legislative elections, however, local
elections are not necessarily far behind. Evidence shows voters consider
both local and state legislative elections to be “second-order.”249 That is,
voters know little about the candidates and usually make their decision
based largely on external cues like national political party affiliation of the
candidate.250 This phenomenon has two effects unique to the local level.
First, in the many cities that use nonpartisan elections, voters have even
less information available on which to base their votes; hence, turnout for
such elections is often even lower than for partisan local elections.251
Second, in partisan local elections, the overwhelming urban preference for
the Democratic Party results in noncompetitive council elections.252
Winning the Democratic nomination is often akin to winning the council
seat. Some observers link the overwhelming dominance of the Democratic
Party with the widely perceived corruption in big cities,253 although there
is scant empirical support for the proposition that large cities are more

247. David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council
Elections?, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 444–45 (2007) [hereinafter Why No Competition?].
248. Low Voter Turnout is a Problem in Cities Across the Country, WHO VOTES
FOR MAYOR?, http://www.whovotesformayor.org [https://perma.cc/C9PZ-KMDC]
(noting that in ten of America’s 30 largest cities, fewer than 15% of voters turn out in
local elections).
249. See David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 11–21), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2739791 [https://perma.cc/8JFV-WFFD].
250. Why No Competition?, supra note 247, at 420 (analyzing city council
elections in New York City and Philadelphia).
251. J. ERIC OLIVER ET AL., LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF SMALLSCALE DEMOCRACY 55, 64–67 (2012).
252. Why No Competition?, supra note 247, at 420.
253. See David Schleicher, I Would But I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit
Nor Voice Substantially Limits Big City Corruption, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 289
(2011) (postulating that “the lack of competition in local elections” leads to
corruption).
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corrupt than small ones.254 Even if corruption exists regarding the award
of government contracts or other forms of largesse, it is hard to see how
such corruption necessarily impugns policy measures like higher
minimum wages and ordinances that seek to promote the public health.
This author’s earlier research has demonstrated that voters may, in
fact, be less aware of the local candidates for whom they are voting, but
that this lack of awareness does not necessarily result in less legitimate
local policy outputs, depending on how legitimacy is defined.255 Rather,
the lower level of participation is offset by the lower costs of both
campaigning at the local level and of lobbying local officials. These lower
costs make local governments more accessible as policy laboratories to
interest groups that are less well-funded and therefore are often weaker at
the higher levels of government where legislative races and lobbying are
more expensive.256 Such interest groups often include more “publicminded” groups like the Center for Science in the Public Interest, which
may have a better chance at pushing its agenda through at lower levels of
government, where money has less influence. Thus, it is not clear that
lower-profile city elections result in less legitimate or desirable policy
outputs.
Putting aside the question of voter participation and awareness, one
can assess city and county elections by the same metric by which this
Article has assessed state and federal elections.257 As an initial matter, all
city and county elections will abide by one-person, one-vote, thereby
eliminating the major problem that affects national lawmaking. With
respect to partisan and ideological fairness, local elections are also on
better footing. In addition to electing their chief executives at large,258 like
almost all governors, but unlike the President, many city councils use at-

254. Assessing the period of 1880–1930, Rebecca Menes found that
corruption correlated with city size, but Menes looked at only the 15 largest cities.
See Rebecca Menes, Graft and Growth in American Cities, 1880 to 1930, in
CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY
(Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds. 2007).
255. Why Innovate?, supra note 8, at 1260–62.
256. Id.
257. See supra Part I.
258. In some smaller cities, members of the council elect the mayor from the
council itself. See Elected Officials, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org
/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-officials/elected-officials [https:
//perma.cc/B6CC-J883] (noting that “voters in the majority of cities (76 percent) elect
the mayor . . . directly” and that “all cities with a population of 250,000 or above vote
directly for the mayor”).
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large elections to select individual council members.259 Assuming,
therefore, that there is some geographical difference in voter ideology or
partisan preference within a city akin to that existing at the state level—
that is, more liberal voters packed into the more densely populated
neighborhoods of a city—this difference will not affect the partisan or
ideological composition of the body if elected at large.
In those cities with district elections and with geographic sorting of
voters, a miniature version of the dynamic that affects state and U.S. House
races might be expected. Liberal voters packed into Manhattan, for instance,
might “waste” their votes on candidates who win overwhelmingly while more
conservative candidates win by smaller margins in the outer reaches of
Queens and Staten Island. The same dynamic could be applied to some other
big cities, like Chicago with its Bungalow Belt or outer San Francisco. In the
largest cities, these dynamics likely have only a minimal effect on city policy,
at least with respect to most of the issues that would attract interest from higher
levels of government. Although it is true that two of the three councilmen
from Staten Island in New York City are Republican, there is only one
additional Republican, who is from Queens, thus giving the Democrats a
47–3 lock on the body.260 This statistic does not mean that all the
Democrats are in agreement and that these disagreements do not
sometimes break down along geographic lines.261 But to the extent that
voters on the fringe experience an advantage, it will usually only be to
block or dilute proposals set forth by representatives of the more densely
packed parts of the city. Thus, any policy output from a city council may
already tilt away from the preferences of the mean city voter, which means
that there is even more reason to protect it from usurpation by higher levels
of government that are systematically biased against cities writ large.
259. Portland, Oregon, for instance, elects all city councilors (or
“commissioners”) at large. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CHARTER § 2-201 (2017). Some
cities use a mix of district and at-large elections to select the members of their
councils. See, e.g., BALT., MD., CITY CHARTER art. III, § 2 (2017) (electing 14
members of council by district, as well as a council president at large); BOSTON,
MASS., CITY CHARTER § 11 & n.2 (2017) (electing nine members of city council
by district and four at large); PHILADELPHIA, PA., HOME RULE CHARTER § 2-100
(2017) (electing ten members of city council by district and seven at large).
260. See Council Members & Districts, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, http://council.nyc
.gov/html/members/members.shtml [https://perma.cc/C5G6-K9PM] (last visited
Mar. 13, 2017).
261. On Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s congestion pricing proposal, for instance,
outer-borough council members were vocally opposed. See Ray Rivera, Traffic
Plan Needs Votes on Council, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2008), http:
//www.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/nyregion/08congest.html [https://perma.cc/9ZNZ
-QKSE].
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Moreover, many prominent issues at the local level defy easy partisan
categorization. Soda taxes, congestion fees, water fluoridation, and horse
carriage rides—these are some of the issues that have riven city councils
and voters of late, even in places where voters and city councils are
overwhelmingly of the same political party.262 Finally, the same caveat
offered above regarding direct democracy must be offered here.263 Any
citywide initiative would not suffer from any of the problems inherent to
first-past-the-post legislative systems. Concerns might still arise when city
voters, for example, opt against water fluoridation despite a city council’s
unanimous support following expert advice, but adherence to one-person,
one-vote and distortion of the median legislator’s views based on
geography are not among the concerns.264
V. IMPLICATIONS AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
If big cities and counties are worthy of some protection from statewide
preemption, what implications might this protection have for remedying
the urban disadvantage at the federal level? As noted in Part I, no doctrinal
path is currently available for protecting local enactments from preemption
by Congress. Hence, local enactments will continue to suffer from a
disadvantage vis-à-vis preemption by the federal government. Efforts by
big cities, for instance, to hold gun manufacturers liable for the harms
inflicted by their products will continue to conflict with the gun lobby’s
exaggerated influence on Capitol Hill, which is due in large part to the
Senate’s malapportionment and the House’s distorted composition.
262. See Tricia L. Nadolny, Soda Tax Passes; Philadelphia Is First Big City in
Nation to Enact One, INQUIRER (June 16, 2016, 8:36 PM), http://www.philly
.com/philly/news/politics/20160617_Philadelphia_City_Council_to_vote_on_soda_
tax.html [https://perma.cc/9B3X-9H82]; J. David Goodman & Michael M.
Grynbaum, Mayor de Blasio’s Carriage-Horse Plan Falters in City Council, N.Y.
TIMES, (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/nyregion/horsecarriage-deal-new-york.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PJ4D-SRTY] (describing the
failure of New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s proposal to limit carriage-horse rides
in Manhattan); Ryan Kost, For the Fourth Time Since 1956, Portland Voters Reject
Fluoridation, THE OREGONIAN: OREGONLIVE (May 21, 2013, 9:59 PM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2013/05/portland_fluoride_for_the_f
our.html [https://perma.cc/PZ74-BBK8]; Diane Cardwell, City Council Approves Fee
to Drive Below 60th, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04
/01/nyregion/01congestion.html [https://perma.cc/R8AZ-LJB7] (describing the
“controversial proposal” that won “wrenching approval” from the New York City
Council “by an unusually slim margin”).
263. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
264. See Kost, supra note 262.
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Nonetheless, constitutional home rule could still help remedy that
disadvantage indirectly.
Constitutional home rule allows policies to take root at the local level
that might otherwise never be adopted or might be preempted quickly after
adoption. If such policies are adopted and persist because of the protection
offered by constitutional home rule, they will offer an example for other
cities, states, and even the federal government to follow. For instance, the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) in 2015 announced a ban on
added trans fats beginning in 2018.265 When New York City was the first
American jurisdiction to ban them ten years ago, opponents of such
regulation and the press ridiculed the move.266 Nonetheless, the New York
state legislature never sought to expressly preempt the city’s ban on trans
fats, and no litigant came forward to urge a court to read aggressively preexisting state statutes to preempt the rule impliedly. Allowing New York
City’s ban on trans fats to take effect changed the national conversation. It
provided momentum for other cities, counties, and states to adopt similar
bans and led to a change in national policy.267 Constitutional home rule,
therefore, can help remedy the urban disadvantage by allowing policies to
advance that might otherwise be halted by state authority.
Local action remains susceptible to being preempted by the federal
government. Once local action is successful and widespread, however,
pressure will exist for any such preemption to retain at least some version
of the increased regulatory scheme that cities had earlier adopted.
Although cities may have adopted a policy that is a “10” on the scale of
regulatory stringency at a time when the federal government rated a “0,”
eventual federal legislation may set a national standard that rates a “5.”
Although “5” is not as good as “10” from urban residents’ perspective, it
is better than “0,” and the nation may never have gone from “0” to “5”
without the local action proceeding and not being preempted.
265. Final Agency Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80
Fed. Reg. 34,650 (June 17, 2015).
266. John Tierney, One Cook Too Many, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2006), http://www
.nytimes.com/2006/09/30/opinion/30tierney.html
[https://perma.cc/N4T2-RBY3]
(describing New York City’s trans-fat ban as “the biggest step yet in turning the Big
Apple into the Big Nanny”); see also Brittany Schaeffer, No Fries for You!,
WILLAMETTE WEEK (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-6206no-fries-for-you.html [https://perma.cc/9KJA-WY5X] (noting “[f]ears of overzealous
government regulation” and warning readers, disingenuously, to “[e]at your
doughnuts while you still can” while Multnomah County, Ore., considered banning
added trans fats in restaurant food).
267. See Why Innovate?, supra note 8, at 1237–38 (describing spread of trans
fat bans to other jurisdictions in years after New York City’s adoption).
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Even if local action does not spur change or preemption at the federal
level, a value in allowing like-minded cities around the nation to adopt
similar policies is still present. Benjamin Barber has written of the need for
a “parliament of mayors” who can share ideas on policy and even agree to
bind each other to certain goals.268 Fordham University has recently sought
to implement this idea.269 At the national level, cities pursuing their own
policies safe from state preemption—and not pushing so far as to provoke
federal preemption—create nodes of policy experimentation that offer relief
to the disadvantaged urban population. Within limits, those preferring the
urban set of policies, like higher minimum wage, stricter gun control, and
more protection for public health, can seek out such policies by moving to
the cities that offer them. Although the option of “voting with one’s feet” is
a pale substitute for a more robust vote by ballot, constitutional home rule
might help make the former a better option while other reforms, like
restrictions on political gerrymandering, seek to bolster the latter.
CONCLUSION
Imagine a world in which North Carolina’s controversial “bathroom
bill” might not preempt Charlotte’s civil rights ordinance, at least with
respect to Charlotte properties and city employees. As this Article has
demonstrated, such a world already exists in several states. More than a
century after its initial emergence, variations of constitutional home rule
persist among the states despite inconsistent application and little in the
way of compelling normative justification. This Article has attempted to
identify such a justification: remedying the urban disadvantage in the state
and national legislative processes.
In other words, if constitutional home rule persists, there should be a
good reason for it. This statement does not mean that constitutional home
rule is the best method for remediating the urban disadvantage at the state
and national levels—it is a second-order solution at best. At the federal level,
far-fetched reforms like evening out Senate apportionment would be far
more effective. Legislative districting reform in the states, which can affect
both U.S. House and state legislative elections, is another, slightly more
realistic remedy than Senate reform. But even neutral redistricting might not
entirely eliminate the urban disadvantage in first-past-the-post elections so

268. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD (2013).
269. Press Release, Global Parliament of Mayors Project, Professors Sheila
Foster and Nestor Davidson to Announce the Inaugural Convening of the Global
Parliament of Mayors and New Fordham Urban Consortium (Feb. 16, 2016) (on
file with author).
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long as compact, contiguous districts are used.270 Given the value of districtbased representation and keeping those districts compact and contiguous,
constitutional home rule can be a tool that allows the benefits of such
districting while mitigating some of its drawbacks. Selecting the right dose
of each medicine is up to each individual state.
For those who are sold on the concept, the question arises as to how
more constitutional home rule will arise given that legislatures in states with
a pronounced urban disadvantage are unlikely to propose such a system. The
two most likely possibilities are the initiative process in the 18 states that
offer it for state constitutional change271 and judicial interpretation. The
initiative process, even with its drawbacks, bypasses any urban disadvantage
that results from single-member districting. If a proposed system of
constitutional home rule distinguishes among cities or counties on the basis
of population, that system may not be an easy sell in rural areas, but the urban
vote might overpower any such objections. Because the swing voters might
be those in mid-size cities or suburbs, a proposal’s population cutoff would
need to be finely tailored to succeed politically and might also depend on the
extent to which regional governments are empowered in the state. With
respect to the judiciary, many state constitutional provisions are capacious
enough to allow for a version of immunity for some local enactments.
Litigants defending city action could articulate the democracy-remediating
benefits of such an interpretation. Particularly in states with egregious political
gerrymandering, courts might lend a sympathetic ear. Just as the Warren
Court saw its role in the one-person, one-vote cases as remediating a structural
flaw in the United States democracy, so might some bold state supreme courts
take up the mantle with respect to constitutional home rule.

270. See Chen & Rodden, supra note 23, at 264 (“[I]n contemporary Florida
and several other urbanized states, voters are arranged in geographic space in such
a way that traditional districting principles of contiguity and compactness will
generate substantial electoral bias in favor of the Republican Party.”).
271. Of these states, two have only an “indirect” constitutional initiative, where a
voter-proposed amendment goes first to the legislature for revision. See Initiative &
Referendum States, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research
/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/9UNXM3XQ] (last reviewed Dec. 2015).
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APPENDIX A. PROTECTION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN ARMS
ACT SENATE VOTE (JULY 2005)
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Kansas274
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire275
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
West Virginia
Wyoming
Total population fully in favor
Indiana
Iowa
Minnesota
New Mexico
Ohio
Vermont
Wisconsin
Total population half in favor

2000 population272
4,447,100
626,932
5,130,632
2,673,400
4,301,261
15,982,378
8,186,453
1,293,953
2,688,418
4,041,769
4,468,976
1,274,923
2,844,658
5,595,211
902,195
1,711,263
1,998,257
1,235,786
8,049,313
642,200
3,450,654
12,281,054
4,012,012
754,844
5,689,283
20,851,820
2,233,169
7,078,515
1,808,344
493,782
134,786,453
6,080,485
2,926,324
4,919,479
1,819,046
11,353,140
608,827
5,363,675
33,070,976

Vote273
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
N
N
N
N

272. The 2000 population data was obtained from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CENSUS 2000 (2001) (Table 1, “States Ranked by Population: 2000”).
273. U.S. Senate Roll Call Vote No. 219 (July 29, 2005), 109th Cong., 1st Sess.,
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?con
gress=109&session=1&vote=00219 [https://perma.cc/R2N4-6B6H].
274. Kansas’s population is halved because one of its senators did not vote. Id.
275. New Hampshire’s population is halved because one of its senators did not
vote. Id.
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California276
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Illinois
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Oregon277
Rhode Island
Washington
Total population fully against
Total population

33,871,648
3,405,565
783,600
1,211,537
12,419,293
5,296,486
6,349,097
9,938,444
8,414,350
18,976,457
3,421,399
1,048,319
5,894,121
92,383,793
260,241,222

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Total in favor
Total against

151,321,941
108,919,281

58%
42%

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

APPENDIX B. STATES WITH SOME JUDICIALLY PROTECTED HOME RULE
This Appendix provides additional explanations and citations for those
states not discussed in the Article.
Arizona
Arizona recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions;
additionally, there is a general law requirement read into the constitution.278
California
California recognizes home-rule immunity for personnel and structural
decisions in addition to providing a general law requirement.279 The state
constitution provides,
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city
governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and
regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to
restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters and in
respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws. City
charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any

276.
Id.
277.
278.
279.

California’s population is halved because one of its senators did not vote.
Oregon’s population is halved because one of its senators did not vote. Id.
See supra notes 150–53.
See supra note 135 for discussion of personnel.
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existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall
supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.280
Colorado
Colorado recognizes home-rule immunity for structural, personnel,
regulatory, and possibly fiscal decisions.281
Connecticut
Connecticut recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions
and partially fiscal decisions. Despite a non-self-executing constitutional
home rule provision—“The general assembly shall by general law
delegate such legislative authority as from time to time it deems
appropriate to towns, cities, and boroughs . . . .”282—the Connecticut
Supreme Court has held that state laws do not preempt municipal
ordinances or charter provisions that are of “local concern.”283 In the fiscal
realm, the court has held that although “a municipality has no inherent
powers of taxation except those expressly granted by the legislature,” a
town charter provision governing the allocation of surplus revenue trumps
a state law to the contrary.284
Hawaii
Hawaii recognizes home-rule immunity for structural and possibly
regulatory decisions in addition to providing a general law requirement.
The state constitution provides some protection for local enactments:
Section 2. Each political subdivision shall have the power to frame
and adopt a charter for its own self-government within such limits
and under such procedures as may be provided by general law.
Such procedures, however, shall not require the approval of a
charter by a legislative body.
Charter provisions with respect to a political subdivision's
executive, legislative and administrative structure and
organization shall be superior to statutory provisions, subject to
the authority of the legislature to enact general laws allocating and

280. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (emphasis added).
281. See supra notes 110–11.
282. CONN. CONST. art. X (emphasis added).
283. Bd. of Educ. of Naugatuck v. Town & Borough of Naugatuck, 843 A.2d
603, 613 (Conn. 2004) (“[I]n an area of local concern, such as local budgetary
policy, general [state] statutory provisions must yield to municipal charter
provisions governing the same subject matter.”).
284. Caulfield v. Noble, 420 A.2d 1160, 1164 (Conn. 1979).
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reallocating powers and functions.
A law may qualify as a general law even though it is inapplicable to
one or more counties by reason of the provisions of this section. . . .
Section 6. This article shall not limit the power of the legislature
to enact laws of statewide concern.285
Interpreting this provision, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that county
charter provisions governing the number and qualifications of water
supply board members, as well as a provision allocating authority for
deciding liquor control violations, trumped state law to the contrary.286 In
doing so, the court noted that “the regulation of the manufacture,
importation and sale of intoxicating liquor within a county is a local
concern.”287 In dicta, the court also noted that “police function,” or control
of the police force, is a local matter.288
Idaho
Idaho provides a general law requirement. The state constitution
states, “Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce,
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are
not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws.”289
Kansas
Kansas recognizes home-rule immunity for regulatory decisions and
also provides a general law requirement. The state constitution provides,
Cities are hereby empowered to determine their local affairs and
government including the levying of taxes, excises, fees, charges
and other exactions except when and as the levying of any tax,
excise, fee, charge or other exaction is limited or prohibited by
enactment of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities of
the same class . . . .290
Interpreting this provision, the Kansas Supreme Court held that because
the state’s Liquor Control Act did not uniformly apply to all cities, a city

285. HAWAII CONST. art. VIII.
286. Haw. Gov’t Emps. Ass’n v. AFSCME, Local 152, 576 P.2d 1029, 1040
(Haw. 1978).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added).
290. KANSAS CONST. art. XII, § 5(b) (emphasis added).
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subject to the law could exempt itself from the act’s prohibition of Sunday
sales.291
Louisiana
Louisiana recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions and
possibly personnel and fiscal decisions. The state constitution allows cities
that had home-rule charters before the constitution’s adoption in 1974 to
“retain the powers, functions, and duties in effect when this constitution is
adopted.”292 This provision would seem to guarantee to such
municipalities any pre-existing immunity from state override. At the same
time, however, the constitution also states that “[n]otwithstanding any
provision in this Article, the police power of the state shall never be
abridged.”293
In upholding the state’s preemption of New Orleans’s charter
amendment establishing a higher minimum wage, the state supreme court
determined that the preemption was justified because it was a “reasonable
exercise of the state’s police power” and “necessary to protect the vital
interest of the state as a whole.”294 The court analyzed thoroughly the
state’s interest in a statewide minimum wage, deferring somewhat to the
legislature’s determinations but reserving the ultimate judgment on the
issue.295 The court’s analysis leaves open the possibility that some other
state law—particularly one outside of the regulatory realm, where the
police power is most apt—might not be read as “necessary to protect the
vital interest of the state as a whole.” In such a case, the local ordinance
would survive if it would have been immune to preemption before 1974.296
Indeed, in a prior structural case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that a state law could not override New Orleans’s method for selecting
members of its aviation board because the statute was not “necessary to
prevent abridgement of a reasonable and valid exercise of the state’s police
power.”297 The court there held that the law was prohibited “because it
changes a home rule government’s distribution of its powers and

291. State ex rel. Klein v. Unified Bd. of Comm’rs, Unified Gov’t of
Wyandotte Cty./Kansas City, 85 P.3d 1237 (Kan. 2004).
292. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
293. Id. § 9(B).
294. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825
So. 2d 1098, 1107–08 (La. 2002).
295. Id. at 1106–07.
296. See id. at 1120 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that New Orleans higher
minimum wage was immune to preemption by state law).
297. Francis v. Morial, 455 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. 1984).
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functions” in violation of the constitution’s home rule article.298 Francis v.
Morial, therefore, is a ringing endorsement of structural home rule in
Louisiana.
Maine
Maine recognizes home-rule immunity for possibly personnel or
structural decisions and also provides a general law requirement. The state
constitution authorizes “[t]he inhabitants of any municipality [to] alter and
amend their charters on all matters, not prohibited by Constitution or
general law, which are local and municipal in character.”299 Moreover, in
dicta in a case involving local personnel, the Maine Supreme Court
recognized the possibility “that municipal ordinances or charter provisions
addressing exclusively local affairs may . . . supersede statutes of statewide application.”300
Massachusetts
Massachusetts provides a general law requirement unless the
legislature follows enhanced procedure for special law. The state
constitution provides,
The general court shall have the power to act in relation to cities
and towns, but only by general laws which apply alike to all cities
or to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer
than two, and by special laws enacted (1) on petition filed or
approved by the voters of a city or town, or the mayor and city
council, or other legislative body, of a city, or the town meeting
of a town, with respect to a law relating to that city or town; (2)
by a two-thirds vote of each branch of the general court following
a recommendation by the governor; (3) to erect and constitute
metropolitan or regional entities, embracing any two or more
cities or towns or cities and towns, or established with other than
existing city or town boundaries, for any general or special public
purpose or purposes, and to grant to these entities such powers,
privileges and immunities as the general court shall deem
necessary or expedient for the regulation and government thereof;
or (4) solely for the incorporation or dissolution of cities or towns
as corporate entities, alteration of city or town boundaries, and
298. Id.
299. ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
300. Lewiston Firefighters Ass’n, Local 785 v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d
154, 162 (Me. 1976) (citing Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48 (1951) (a case
involving local elections)).
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merger or consolidation of cities and towns, or any of these
matters.301
Minnesota
A Minnesota Supreme Court dissent suggests there is home-rule
immunity for personnel decisions. In deciding a lawsuit challenging a
1993 Minneapolis resolution extending health benefits to same-sex
partners, one judge on the Minnesota Supreme Court dissented from the
court’s holding that the resolution was overridden by state law.302 Judge
Schumacher would have upheld the resolution despite the seemingly
inconsistent state law in part because “the grant of medical benefits to city
employees is solely of local concern and pertaining to management of
municipal government.”303
Missouri
Missouri recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions and
possibly regulatory decisions, such as eminent domain. Unlike most states,
the Missouri courts still occasionally strike down an exercise of local initiative
power as beyond the realm of local authority, even in the absence of any
preemptive state law. In Missouri Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. St. Louis County, for
instance, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the county’s “Mortgage
Foreclosure Intervention Code” was beyond the authority granted to the
county by the state constitution because it “address[ed] a national crisis.”304
As such, the ordinance addressed a “statewide issue” and therefore was not
the kind of “purely local concern” the county was authorized to regulate.305
At the same time, however, a Missouri court of appeals has upheld a
county charter provision regulating the members of a condemnation
commission against inconsistent state law.306 At least in the realm of eminent
domain, locally adopted procedures trump those found in state law.307

301. MASS. CONST. art. LXXXIX, § 8 (emphasis added).
302. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1995).
303. Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
304. 448 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Mo. 2014).
305. Id.
306. State ex rel. St. Louis Cty. v. Campbell, 498 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973).
307. Id. at 836 (“It has been consistently held that the power of condemnation
is a matter of local concern so that the procedure specified in the charter
supersedes the statutes.”).
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Nebraska
Nebraska recognizes home-rule immunity for limited structural
decisions.308
New Mexico
New Mexico recognizes home-rule immunity for structural and
personnel decisions in addition to providing a general law requirement.309
New York
New York provides a general law requirement with exceptions for
special law. The state constitution provides,
[T]he legislature . . . [s]hall have the power to act in relation to the
property, affairs or government of any local government only by
general law, or by special law only (a) on request of two-thirds of
the total membership of its legislative body or on request of its chief
executive officer concurred in by a majority of such membership,
or (b) except in the case of the city of New York, on certificate of
necessity from the governor reciting facts which in the judgment of
the governor constitute an emergency requiring enactment of such
law and, in such latter case, with the concurrence of two-thirds of
the members elected to each house of the legislature.310
While the New York Constitution does not immunize any areas of local
law absolutely to state override, it ensures that any such override is either
by general law or by the permitted circumstances for special law. Much
case law in New York, therefore, revolves around whether a particular
state enactment regulates a local matter and thus needs to be enacted
pursuant to the procedures for passing a special law.311
North Dakota
North Dakota recognizes home-rule immunity for structural and
personnel decisions. The state constitution provides a foundation for home

308. See supra notes 158–61.
309. See supra notes 148–49.
310. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2) (emphasis added).
311. E.g., Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State, 993 N.E.2d 393, 400 (N.Y. 2013)
(noting that the legislature may pass special laws without going through special
procedures of N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2)(b), if the state has a “substantial
interest” in the subject matter).
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rule,312 but the details are statutory.313 The home-rule statute provides that
the charter and ordinances made pursuant to the charter supersede “any
law of the state in conflict,” at least when such municipal enactments deal
with local or city matters.314 In applying this statutory scheme, the North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld a city’s decision to merge police and city
employee pension funds despite arguably conflicting state law.315
Similarly, the state attorney general opined that the home-rule city of
Grand Forks could change the composition of its library board in a manner
that conflicted with state law because the composition of such boards is a
matter of local rather than statewide concern.316
Ohio
Ohio recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions in
addition to providing a robust general law requirement.317
Oregon
Oregon recognizes home-rule immunity for limited structural
decisions.318
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania recognizes home-rule immunity for structural and
personnel decisions.319
Rhode Island
Rhode Island recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions
and also provides a general law requirement. The state constitution states,
The general assembly shall have the power to act in relation to the
property, affairs and government of any city or town by general
laws which shall apply alike to all cities and towns, but which shall
not affect the form of government of any city or town. The general
312. N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (“The legislative assembly shall provide by law
for the establishment and exercise of home rule in counties and cities.”).
313. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 40-05.1 (West 2017).
314. Id. § 40-05.1-05.
315. Klug v. City of Minot, 795 N.W.2d 906 (N.D. 2011).
316. Office of Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter No. 2011-L-03 2011 WL 916177
(N.D. Mar. 14, 2011).
317. See supra notes 137–47, 197, 199.
318. See supra note 15; Paul A. Diller, The Partly Fulfilled Promise of Home
Rule in Oregon, 87 OR. L. REV. 939 (2008).
319. See supra note 115.
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assembly shall also have the power to act in relation to the
property, affairs and government of a particular city or town
provided that such legislative action shall become effective only
upon approval by a majority of the qualified electors of the said city
or town voting at a general or special election, except that in the
case of acts involving the imposition of a tax or the expenditure of
money by a town the same shall provide for the submission thereof
to those electors in said town qualified to vote upon a proposition
to impose a tax or for the expenditure of money.320
The constitution specifically reserves “the form of government” to local
discretion and immunizes it from preemption. Other “local” matters may
be preempted, but only by “general” legislation.321 The court has also
stated in dicta that municipalities may not legislate at all on matters of
statewide concern.322
South Carolina
South Carolina provides a general law requirement. The state
constitution states,
The General Assembly shall provide by general law for the structure,
organization, powers, duties, functions, and the responsibilities of
counties, including the power to tax different areas at different rates
of taxation related to the nature and level of governmental services
provided. Alternate forms of government, not to exceed five, shall be
established. No laws for a specific county shall be enacted and no
county shall be exempted from the general laws or laws applicable to
the selected alternative form of government.323
Additionally, “The structure and organization, powers, duties, functions,
and responsibilities of the municipalities shall be established by general
law; provided, that not more than five alternative forms of government
shall be authorized.”324 These provisions prohibit special legislation that
aim to restructure municipal or county government boards.325
320. R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (emphasis added).
321. See, e.g., Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174 (R.I. 1994); Bruckshaw v.
Paolino, 557 A.2d 1221, 1224 (R.I. 1989).
322. Westerly Residents for Thoughtful Dev., Inc. v. Brancato, 565 A.2d 1262,
1264 (R.I. 1989).
323. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (emphasis added).
324. Id. § 9.
325. E.g., Davis v. Richland Cty. Council, 642 S.E.2d 740, 742–43 (S.C.
2007).
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South Dakota
South Dakota provides a general law requirement. The state
constitution states, “A chartered [local] governmental unit may exercise
any legislative power or perform any function not denied by its charter,
the Constitution or the general laws of the state.”326
Tennessee
Tennessee provides a general law requirement. The state constitution
states, “[T]he General Assembly shall act with respect to . . . home rule
municipalit[ies] only by laws which are general in terms and effect.”327
Texas
Texas provides a general law requirement. The state constitution
states, “[N]o [home-rule] charter or any ordinance passed under said
charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of
the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.”328
Wisconsin
Some Wisconsin Supreme Court dissenting opinions suggest vestiges
of immunity in addition to a general law requirement.329
Wyoming
Wyoming provides a uniformity requirement. The state constitution
states, “All cities and towns are hereby empowered to determine their local
affairs and government as established by ordinance passed by the
governing body . . . further subject only to statutes uniformly applicable to
all cities and towns . . . .”330

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (emphasis added).
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (emphasis added).
TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (emphasis added).
See supra note 200.
WYO. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(b) (emphasis added).

